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“They are our heroes. We shall not forget them.”
inscription, Canadian Police And Peace Officer's Memorial

Be Smart & Stay Safe

Volume 16 Issue 2

Volume 16 Issue 2 - March/April 2016

Highlights In This Issue
What’s New For Police In The Library

3

Implied Licence Doctrine Depends On Officer’s
Purpose

4

Helping Purchaser Does Not Necessarily Mean
Aiding Seller

6

Antique Firearm’ Not Only Determined By Age

7

Inventory Search Not Justified: Marihuana Excluded

9

Passenger In Stopped Vehicle Not Necessarily
Detained

11

Entrapment Application Rejected: Police Acted On
Reasonable Suspicion

14

Asking If Someone Can Hook A Person Up With
Drugs Is Not, By Itself, Entrapment

18

Policing Across Canada: Facts & Figures

20

Unless otherwise noted all articles are authored by
Mike Novakowski, MA, LLM. The articles contained
herein are provided for information purposes only
and are not to be construed as legal or other
professional advice. The opinions expressed herein
are not necessarily the opinions of the Justice
Institute of British Columbia. “In Service: 10-8”
welcomes your comments or contributions to this
newsletter.

Upcoming Courses
Advanced	
 Police	
 Training
Advanced training provides opportunities for skill
development and career enhancement for police
officers. Training is offered in the areas of
investigation, patrol operations and leadership for
in-service municipal and RCMP police officers.

JIBC	
 Police	
 Academy
See Course List here.

NEW JIBC Graduate
Certificate in Public
Safety Leadership

2016
BC LAW ENFORCEMENT
MEMORIAL
This year’s Memorial Service will be hosted by
the Vancouver Police Department and Delta
Police Department.

National	
 Library	
 of	
 Canada	
 
Cataloguing	
 in	
 Publication	
 
Data
Main entry under title:
In service: 10-8. -- Vol. 1, no. 1 (June 2001)
Monthly
Title from caption.
“A newsletter devoted to operational police
officers across British Columbia.”
ISSN 1705-5717 = In service, 10-8

Date & Time:
Sunday, September 25, 2016 at 1:00 PM

Location:
Brockton Oval in Stanley Park, Vancouver, BC

1. Police - British Columbia - Periodicals. 2.
Police - Legal status, laws, etc. - Canada Cases - Periodicals. I. Justice Institute of
British Columbia. Police Academy. II. Title: In
service, 10-8. III. Title: In service, ten-eight.
PAGE 2

Graduate Certificates
Intelligence Analysis
or
Tactical Criminal Analysis
www.jibc.ca

see
pages
23-24

Volume 16 Issue 2 - March/April 2016
Change management: a guide to effective
implementation.
Los Angeles, CA: SAGE, 2016.
HD 58.8 M33 2016

WHATʼS	
 NEW	
 FOR	
 POLICE	
 IN	
 
THE	
 LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its
recent acquisitions which may be of interest to
police.

50 top tools for coaching: a complete toolkit for
developing and empowering people.
Gillian Jones and Ro Gorell.
London; Philadelphia, PA: Kogan Page, 2015.
HD 30.4 J656 2015
101 great answers to the toughest interview
questions.
Ron Fry.
Wayne, NJ: Career Press, Inc., 2016.
HF 5549.5 I6 F75 2016
101 smart questions to ask on your interview.
Ron Fry.
Wayne, NJ: Career Press, Inc., 2016.
HF 5549.5 I6 F757 2016

Design as scholarship: case studies from the
learning sciences.
Edited by Vanessa Svihla and Richard Reeve.
New York, NY: Routledge, 2016.
LB 1060 D39 2016
Design for how people learn.
Julie Dirksen.
San Francisco, CA: New Riders, 2016.
LB 1060 D57 2016
Engaging minds: cultures of education and
practices of teaching.
Brent Davis, Dennis Sumara, and Rebecca LuceKapler.
New York, NY: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group,
2015.
LB 1060 D38 2015
Generation me: why today's young Americans are
more confident, assertive, entitled--and more
miserable than ever before.
Jean M. Twenge, Ph. D.
New York, NY: Atria Paperback, 2014.
HQ 799.7 T94 2014

Becoming a master student.
Dave Ellis, Doug Toft, contributing editor,
Debra Dawson (Western University)
Toronto, ON: Nelson Education, 2016.
LB 2343.3 E44 2016
Behavioral guide to personality disorders
(DSM-5).
Douglas H. Ruben, PH. D.
Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, LTD.,
2015.
RC 554 R83 2015
Canadian family law.
Julien D. Payne and Marilyn A. Payne.
Toronto, ON: Irwin Law, 2015.
KE 539 P295 2015

Children's law handbook.
Marvin A. Zuker and Lynn M. Kirwin.
Toronto, ON: Carswell, 2015.
KE 512 Z85 2015

Mindful management: the neuroscience of trust
and effective workplace leadership.
Dalton A. Kehoe.
Richmond Hill, ON: Communicate for Life, Ltd.,
2015.
HD 57.7 K44 2015
The student's survival guide to research.
Monty L. McAdoo.
Chicago, IL: Neal-Schuman, 2015.
ZA 3075 M43 2015

PAGE 3

Volume 16 Issue 2 - March/April 2016

IMPLIED	
 LICENCE	
 APPLICATION	
 
DEPENDS	
 ON	
 OFFICERʼS	
 PURPOSE
R. v. Parr, 2016 BCCA 99
The accused was arrested at the
roadside under BC’s Mental Health
Act. He was transported to a hospital
for medical care, his vehicle was
impounded and police took charge of
his dog. The investigator contacted another
detachment, some 3 1/2 hours away, and asked that
another police officer assist by attending the
accused’s property in an effort to locate his fiance,
advise her of the situation, and see if arrangements
could be made to pick up the dog. The assisting
officer knew the accused was also the subject of an
ongoing marihuana grow-op investigation. The
assisting officer attended the accused’s residence at
2:52 am. He found no vehicles present but the lights
to the main building and a secondary residence
were illuminated.
The officer walked straight to the front door of the
house and knocked. A sign on the front door read,
“Please use the side door.” The officer heard a
television or radio on inside the house and could
smell vegetative marihuana. Since no one answered
the front door, the officer walked to the side door
and knocked loudly. Again, he could smell
vegetative marihuana. A PVC pipe was noted at the
side of the house that appeared to be venting air
from the basement. With no answer at the side door,
the officer went to the secondary residence and
noted plastic sheeting and blinds covering some of
its windows. This residence did not appear to be
occupied and there was no answer to the officer’s
knocking on a sliding door. He did not do a
perimeter search of the property. The officer then left
the property and stopped on the highway to see if he
could smell marihuana upwind from the property,
but he could not.
This olfactory information obtained from the entry
onto the accused’s property was used in conjunction
with the pre-existing grow-op investigation, and a
search warrant was obtained and executed. A large
marihuana grow operation was located on the
property along with some guns. The accused was
charged with drug and weapon offences.

BC Supreme Court
The officer testified to the following:
• He attended the accused’s property to locate the
fiancée, notify her that the accused was on his
way to the hospital and see if someone could
take custody of the dog.
• He was aware that a drug investigation was
ongoing and that he might make observations
confirming or dispelling suspicions that the
accused’s residence housed a marihuana growop.
• He had no grounds to be on the property to
investigate a potential marihuana grow-op and
went straight to the doors to determine if anyone
was home.
• He immediately left the property when no one
answered.
• He would not have gone to the residence had
he not received the request for assistance.
• He did not place a phone call to handle the
request because “bad medical news about
somebody” was best delivered in person and an
unanswered phone call would not confirm that
no one was home.
• He denied the suggestion that his motivation for
attending the property was, at least in part, to
further an ongoing criminal investigation.
The judge concluded that the officer was entitled to
enter onto the property under the implied licence to
knock doctrine. The purpose of the entry was to
communicate with an occupant by notifying next of
kin of a medical emergency. The entry was not to

PAGE 4

Volume 16 Issue 2 - March/April 2016

“Where the police knock for the sole purpose of facilitating communication with an
occupant, they act within the scope of the implied invitation. In these circumstances, no
constitutionally recognized search occurs because the entry does not intrude upon the
occupant’s reasonable expectation of privacy. The waiver of privacy rights embodied in
the implied invitation extends no further than is required to achieve this purpose.”
gather evidence in furtherance of the drug
investigation. The officer’s knowledge of the ongoing
drug investigation did not undermine his otherwise
valid purpose of communicating with an occupant
about the accused’s emergency medical condition.
Thus, the officer’s observations properly formed part
of the reasonable grounds for the search warrant.
The accused was convicted of producing marihuana,
possession for the purpose of trafficking and
improperly storing firearms.

British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused appealed his
conviction arguing the trial
judge erred in the application
of the implied licence doctrine.
In the accused’s view, the officer was motivated, at
least in part, by an investigative purpose when he
entered onto the property and smelled the
marihuana. This, he asserted, undermined the
implied licence doctrine.

police approach the dwelling as an intruder.
[para. 2]

If the approach to the home for the purpose of
communicating is motivated by an investigative
purpose, such as smelling for marihuana, the police
conduct exceeds the scope of the implied licence to
knock principle and the search is subject to s. 8
Charter scrutiny.
Justice Fitch, writing the unanimous appeal decision,
found the trial judge did not err in concluding that
the officer entered onto the property for the limited
purpose of communicating with the occupants. His
intention was not to further an investigative aim. He
stated:
In my view, it is important to distinguish ...
between the purpose for the entry and
knowledge on the part of the police of the
potential that evidence might be acquired in the
course of that entry. Provided the police act for a
purpose falling within the scope of the implied
invitation to knock principle, and for no other
reason, the fact they are aware evidence might
be acquired in the course of the entry does not
make them “intruders” acting outside the scope
of the doctrine. I accept, however, that the
existence of an ongoing criminal investigation at
the time of the entry, and advertence by the
police to the prospect of gathering evidence in
the course of that entry, are relevant
considerations to be taken into account when
determining the purpose for which the entry and
knock was undertaken. [para. 55]

Implied Licence (Invitation) to Knock
Under the common law, the “occupants of a home
are deemed to have waived their reasonable
expectation of privacy for defined purposes’” said
the Court of Appeal. It continued:
Where the police knock for the sole purpose of
facilitating communication with an occupant,
they act within the scope of the implied
invitation. In these circumstances, no
constitutionally recognized search occurs
because the entry does not intrude upon the
occupant’s reasonable expectation of privacy.
The waiver of privacy rights embodied in the
implied invitation extends no further than is
required to achieve this purpose. Where the
conduct of the police goes beyond that which is
permitted by the implied licence to knock, the
conditions of that licence are breached and the

Justice Fitch, however, rejected the notion that a
dual purpose in approaching the door to knock
could not undermine the implied licence doctrine,
finding such reasoning “incompatible with the
implied licence principle.” In other words, the
police exceed implied licence and cannot rely on it
where they have both a purpose to speak to an
occupant (even if this is the “predominant or

PAGE 5

Volume 16 Issue 2 - March/April 2016
primary purpose”) while at the same time they have
a secondary purpose motivated by an investigative
goal such as sniffing for the presence of drugs.
Rather, the communication must be the sole purpose
for the entry as the trial judge had in fact found in
this case. The accused’s appeal was dismissed.

BY THE BOOK:
Parties	
 to	
 Offence: Criminal Code
s. 21(1) Every one is a party to an offence who

Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca

(a) actually commits it;

HELPING	
 PURCHASER	
 DOES	
 NOT	
 
NECESSARILY	
 MEAN	
 AIDING	
 
SELLER
R. v. Machushek, 2016 SKCA 41
Two undercover officers entered a bar
to see if they could further an
investigation into cocaine trafficking.
They played pool and mingled with a
group of people, including the accused.
After a few hours of drinking, the officers initiated a
discussion with the accused about buying cocaine.
When the bar closed, he took the officers back to his
home where they used the bathroom and admired
woodworking projects. The accused made a call to a
drug dealer and then all three drove in the officers’
truck to a darkened street to meet the seller. The
seller sold each person a gram of cocaine. The
accused did not handle the officers’ money or the
cocaine intended for them, nor did he receive any
payment from the seller or the officers. After the
buy, the three went back to the accused’s home. He
asked the officers to come in and party but they
declined. Several months later the accused was
arrested and charged with two counts of trafficking
and two counts of possessing proceeds of crime.

Saskatchewan Provincial Court
The judge found the accused did not
commit any acts of trafficking in his own
right nor was he a party to the offence.
He did not aid (s. 21(1)(b) Criminal
Code) or abet (s. 21(1)(c)) the seller such that he
would have been guilty of the seller’s act of
trafficking. Rather, the judge held that the accused
was “facilitating a buy as a buyer” and that he and
the two officers were “joint purchasers.” The accused
was acquitted of the trafficking charges. He was also
acquitted of the proceeds charges because he did

(b) does or omits to do anything for the
purpose of aiding any person to commit it; or
(c) abets any person in committing it.

not receive any money as a result of the transaction
nor had he ever held any of the officers’ money.

Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
Th e C r ow n a p p e a l e d t h e
acquittals suggesting that the
accused was guilty of trafficking
because he aided and abetted
the trafficker. In the Crown’s view, if the purchase
would not have taken place without the assistance of
the accused, he should be found guilty of aiding and
abetting cocaine trafficking.
Justice Jackson, however, felt this reasoning would
set the bar too low in determining what constitutes
aiding or abetting drug trafficking. Not every act that
assists a purchase of drugs can lead to a finding of
guilt for trafficking. Otherwise, a friend who drives a
buyer across town to purchase drugs would be guilty
of trafficking. “With respect to the actus reus, where
the facts reveal no more than incidental assistance of
the sale through rendering aid to the purchaser,
the ... proper charge is not trafficking, regardless of
intent,” said Justice Jackson. “With respect to the
mens rea, ... the test is whether the assistance is
rendered solely to the purchaser or, cast in different
terms, but arriving at the same result, whether the
‘acts are designed to aid the purchaser’.”
The Court of Appeal provided a summary to assist in
determining whether a person committed a
trafficking offence:

PAGE 6

[W]hen the charge is trafficking and the theory
of the Crown is that the accused is guilty of
trafficking either as a principal or as a party, the
analytical framework to apply is as follows:

Volume 16 Issue 2 - March/April 2016

(a) has the accused committed any acts of
trafficking in his or her own right?
(b) if no, did any acts or omissions of the
accused aid or abet the trafficker in the
commission of the offence of trafficking?
(c) if yes, do the facts reveal something more
than incidental assistance to the trafficker
through rendering assistance to the
purchaser?
(d) if yes, did the accused know that the
trafficker intended to commit the offence of
trafficking?
(e) if yes, did the accused intend to aid or abet
the trafficker in the commission of the
offence of trafficking? [para. 72]

BY THE BOOK:
Antique	
 Firearm: Criminal Code
s. 84(1) antique firearm means
(a) any firearm manufactured before 1898 that
was not designed to discharge rim-fire or
centre-fire ammunition and that has not been
redesigned to discharge such ammunition, or
(b) any firearm that is prescribed to be an antique firearm;

Here, the trial judge did not err in finding the
accused’s intent was to aid himself and the police
officers in buying cocaine, and not to aid the seller.
The Crown’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org

ʻANTIQUE	
 FIREARMʼ	
 NOT	
 ONLY	
 
DETERMINED	
 BY	
 AGE
R. v. Kennedy, 2016 MBCA 5
The accused was arrested outside his
house trailer for breaching a courtordered condition that he have no
contact with his neighbour. He was
patted-down for officer safety
incidental to arrest and two loaded handguns were
found in his pants’ pockets. Both guns were cocked
and ready to fire. The guns were very old but testing
confirmed that they were functional, although one
fired intermittently. Police obtained warrants to
search the accused’s trailer and found eight guns, 12
magazines and 200 rounds of ammunition including
a Clement Arms .32 calibre British Bulldog revolver
with five rounds in its cylinder. The accused was
charged with breach of recognizance and firearms
offences.

Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench
The accused was convicted of several
offences but acquitted on a charge under
s. 91(1) of the Criminal Code for
possessing a prohibited firearm without

a registration certificate because the British Bulldog
revolver was an antique firearm for the purpose of s.
84(3). Section 84(3) deems certain weapons,
including an antique firearm, not to be firearm for
the purpose of s. 91(1). An antique firearm is defined
as including “any firearm manufactured before 1898
that was not designed to discharge rim-fire or centrefire ammunition and that has not been redesigned to
discharge such ammunition.” The judge found the
“expert witnesses called on behalf of the Crown
were unable to determine whether this particular
firearm was manufactured before or after 1898.”
Thus, the Crown failed to prove the essential
elements under s. 91(1).

Manitoba Court of Appeal
Th e C r ow n a p p e a l e d t h e
accused’s acquittal on the s. 91
(1) charge, among other things,
arguing that the trial judge
erred in only considering the year of manufacture.
Rather, the Crown suggested that the definition of
antique firearm also requires that the firearm cannot
be designed, or re-designed, to discharge rim-fire or
centre-fire ammunition. In this case, a Crown expert
testified that the British Bulldog revolver fires centrefire ammunition. Therefore, the British Bulldog
revolver did not fall within the definition of antique
firearm.
The Court of Appeal overturned the acquittal and
entered a conviction on the s. 91(1) charge.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org

PAGE 7

Volume 15 Issue 4 - July/August 2015

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PAGE 32

Volume 16 Issue 2 - March/April 2016

INVENTORY	
 SEARCH	
 NOT	
 
JUSTIFIED:	
 MARIHUANA	
 
EXCLUDED

BY THE BOOK:

R. v. Harflett, 2016 ONCA 248

Driving	
 prohibited	
 while	
 licence	
 suspended

The accused was arrested for driving
with a Quebec driver’s licence while
his Ontario licence was suspended
under s. 36 of Ontario’s Highway
Traffic Act (HTA). He was patted down
and read his rights. Since the accused could not
drive the vehicle and it had to be removed from the
highway as it posed a safety concern, a tow truck
was called. The officer decided to have the car
towed to a nearby hotel with the accused riding in
the tow truck with its driver. The accused could then
pay his fines the following day, get his Ontario
license back and resume his journey.

Ontario’s Highway Traffic Act
Driving prohibited while licence suspended
s. 36 A person whose driver’s licence or
privilege to drive a motor vehicle in Ontario
has been suspended shall not drive a motor
vehicle or street car in Ontario under a driver’s
licence or permit issued by any other jurisdiction during the
suspension.

[The officer] had to remove the vehicle from
Highway 401, the accused could not drive it and
there was no one else to drive the vehicle. It was
therefore the responsibility of [the officer]. It was
reasonable to assess any pre-existing damage to
the vehicle, to verify any valuables in the vehicle
and whether there were any weapons or other
dangerous items in the vehicle. [The officer] was
going to release the accused and the vehicle to a
hotel and therefore, had to verify that there was
nothing dangerous in the vehicle and, prior to
the tow to the hotel, the state of the vehicle and
valuables.

While waiting for the tow truck, the officer
conducted an inventory search of the vehicle as he
always did in such circumstances. When he opened
the trunk, he smelled the odour of raw marijuana
and found a large quantity of it. He immediately
arrested the accused for possessing marijuana for the
purpose of trafficking and re-read the right to
counsel. The car was then towed to the police
station and a full search was performed.

Ontario Court of Justice
The officer testified that he searches
“every vehicle” for which he calls a tow
truck. He will first check for exterior
damage and then search inside, looking
for weapons, other dangerous items and valuables.
He said he was “totally responsible” for the car and
searched it to protect himself, the accused and the
tow truck operator. He said he was concerned about
weapons that the accused might use to harm the tow
truck operator and wanted to protect the operator
against any allegations of stolen valuables.
The accused claimed his s. 8 Charter rights had been
breached by the initial inventory search before it was
to be towed to a hotel. In his view, the officer had no
authority to conduct such a search. The judge,
however, disagreed and found that the inventory
search was reasonable. She stated:

Further, even if there was a s, 8 violation, the
evidence was admissible under s. 24(2). The judge
found the officer acted in good faith, any breach was
technical as there is a lower expectation of privacy
in his vehicle on a public roadway, and the
marijuana was real evidence. The accused was
convicted of possessing marihuana for the purpose
of trafficking and he was sentenced to a year in jail
plus 12 months of probation.

Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued that the
trial judge erred in finding the
inventory search reasonable.
He suggested that the police
officer had neither the statutory or the common law
authority to conduct an inventory search of his
vehicle. Moreover, if the search was unreasonable,
the accused asserted that the trial judge erred in

PAGE 9

Volume 16 Issue 2 - March/April 2016
admitting the evidence under s. 24(2). In the
accused’s view it should have been excluded.

“[T]he power to detain an individual
under the HTA does not inevitably
include the power to detain or impound
a vehicle, nor does it include the power
to conduct an inventory search in every
situation. The officer must be able to
point to a specific duty or authority to
justify his search ...”

Inventory Search
In this case, the search of the car was warrantless
and therefore presumptively unreasonable. “To
justify a warrantless search, the Crown must
establish, on the balance of probabilities, that (i) the
search was authorized by law; (ii) the law is
reasonable; and (iii) the search was carried out in a
reasonable manner,” said Justice Lauwers, writing
the Court of Appeal’s decision. Although the
accused’s initial detention to investigate a possible
contravention of the HTA was lawful, the inventory
search that followed was not authorized by law:
[T]he power to detain an individual under the
HTA does not inevitably include the power to
detain or impound a vehicle, nor does it include
the power to conduct an inventory search in
every situation. The officer must be able to point
to a specific duty or authority to justify his
search of the [accused’s] vehicle.
The inventory search cannot be justified on the
basis of officer safety or any suspicion that the
[accused] was involved in criminal conduct. The
officer testified that after arresting the [accused]
for the first time for driving while his licence was
suspended, he did not impound or seize the
[accused’s] car, because he was only conducting
a t ra f f i c i nve s t i g a t i o n , n o t a c r i m i n a l
investigation. He agreed the [accused] was
polite, cooperative and non-confrontational
throughout. The officer testified that there was,
“nothing to hint of criminality, zero. He ... had
no prior criminal record. He was not listed on
any of the police records as being involved in
any type of criminal activity, he was just simply
a suspended driver.” The officer agreed that he
had no reason to believe that the vehicle
contained any weapons or other dangerous
items. [paras. 20-21]

“The police decision to call a tow truck
to remove a vehicle does not justify an
inventory search in every case.”

No statutory provision that authorized police to
impound the vehicle or to search the car was
identified, nor did the common law provide
authority to impound it. “[T]he officer did not
impound the vehicle or exercise the degree of
control of the vehicle that would have made an
inventory search necessary,” said Justice Lauwers.
“The police decision to call a tow truck to remove a
vehicle does not justify an inventory search in every
case.” Nor was there anything in the circumstances
that triggered the need for an inventory search. The
officer had no public safety concerns; he was going
to release the car to the accused:
In this instance it was quite reasonable for the
officer to look at the exterior of the car and to
note any damage before asking the tow operator
to take it to the hotel. The officer had taken at
least that degree of control over the car.
But the other reasons given by the officer for the
inventory search do not hold up to scrutiny and
pass constitutional muster. The owner was not
going to be separated from the car, but was to
ride with the tow operator to the hotel. There
was accordingly no reason for the tow operator
to access the interior of the car and the police
officer had no cause to be concerned for the
operator’s safety. [paras. 26-27]

The officer’s duty obliged him to remove the car
from the highway for safety reasons, but the
exigencies of the situation did not provide a
reasonable basis for an inventory search. Thus, the
search was unreasonable and the accused’s s. 8
rights had been infringed.

PAGE 10

Volume 16 Issue 2 - March/April 2016

s. 24(2) Charter
In considering the s. 24(2) lines of inquiry (the
seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct,
the impact on the Charter-protected interests of the
accused and society’s interest in adjudication on the
merits), the Court of Appeal excluded the marihuana
as evidence. The police misconduct was serious and
favoured exclusion. “[The officer’s] invariable
practice of searching every car fits the description of
an impermissible ‘fishing expedition conducted at a
random highway stop’,” said Justice Lauwers:
As an instructor of other police officers, he ought
to be fully conversant with his legal authority,
but the evidence shows either that he was not or
that he was prepared to search regardless. His
attitude was exemplified by his testimony: he
resisted the notion that what he did was a
“search”: “I do an inventory sir, not a search”.
This was plainly a search. [para. 44]

indicating sudden braking. Radar showed a speed of
98 km/h suggesting the vehicle was exceeding the
speed limit before it braked and dipped. The officer
pulled the vehicle over under s. 209.1 of
Saskatchewan's Traffic Safety Act to check vehicle
fitness, the driver’s licence and sobriety, and the
vehicle’s registration.
As the officer approached the truck, he observed the
accused Zahar in the driver’s seat and the accused
Mooiman in the front passenger seat. He noticed
Mooiman had a freshly lit cigarette in his mouth and
learned the two men were travelling from Saskatoon,
Saskatchewan, to Richmond, British Columbia. The
officer also observed that the men appeared very
nervous—giggling and moving around—and that fast
food wrappers were on the floor boards of the truck.
These observations were striking to the officer. First,
in his experience, people generally discard their
cigarettes when they are stopped by the police—
they do not light fresh ones—and he had been
taught that cigarette smoke can be used to mask the
odour of alcohol or narcotics in a vehicle. Second,
while both occupants were very nervous, the
passenger Mooiman had no reason to be nervous—
he did not face any jeopardy. Additionally, fast-food
wrappers were a common marker in the transport of
narcotics by motor vehicle.

Ministry of
Transportation
and Highways

September 2000

NOTE: Speed Zone practice is to limit speed reduction
The s. 8 breach was not technical, as described by
the trial judge. The officer had no authority or
justification to conduct any type of search inside the
vehicle despite there being a lower expectation of
privacy in it while on a public roadway. The impact
of an unjustified search is magnified where there is a
total absence of justification for it.
The accused’s appeal was allowed, the evidence was
excluded and an acquittal was entered.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca

R. v. Mooiman & Zahar, 2016 SKCA 43
A police officer
with a drug
sniffing dog was
on traffic patrol.
He saw a truck
approaching at a high rate of
speed along a highway with a
speed limit of 100 km/h. The
truck’s front end quickly dipped

R-4X

100 km/h

PASSENGER	
 IN	
 STOPPED	
 
VEHICLE	
 NOT	
 NECESSARILY	
 
DETAINED

The officer queried both men through the Canadian
Police Information Centre (CPIC) database and
Police Information Portal (PIP) database. CPIC
showed only that Mooiman had a criminal record
but PIP had entries associating both Mooiman and
Zahar with criminal drug activity. The officer then
detained both men to investigate them for drug
possession. Zahar was placed in the police vehicle
while Mooiman was questioned in the truck. When
Mooiman was informed by the officer that a sniffer
dog would be deployed and asked whether the dog
would indicate, Mooiman produced a plastic bag
containing marihuana. When the officer asked,
Mooiman said that Zahar knew of this marihuana.
Both men were arrested for possessing a controlled
substance. When the truck was searched, a duffle
bag containing 1.9 lbs of packaged marihuana was
located under a doghouse in the truck’s box. Both
men were then re-arrested for possessing marihuana
for the purposes of trafficking.

PAGE 11

Volume 16 Issue 2 - March/April 2016

BY THE BOOK:
Authority	
 to	
 Stop
Saskatchewan’s Traffic Safety Act
209.1(1) A peace officer may require the person
in charge of or operating a motor vehicle to
stop that vehicle if the peace officer:
(a)
and

is readily identifiable as a peace officer;

(b) is in the lawful execution of his or her duties and
responsibilities.

marihuana (not exceeding three kilograms) for the
purpose of trafficking. They were sentenced to a 20month conditional sentence order.

Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
Both accused appealed their
convictions arguing, in part,
that the trial judge erred in
assessing the legality of their
detentions and arrests under s. 9 of the Charter.
Further, they submitted that the search of the truck
and seizure of the marihuana violated their rights
under s. 8. In their view, the evidence should have
been excluded under s. 24(2).

Saskatchewan Provincial Court

Passenger’s Detention & Arrest

The judge found the PIP entries had
tipped the balance from mere suspicion
to reasonable suspicion and that is when
the detention for investigatory purposes
commenced. These entries indicated that Mooiman
had some kind of previous involvement in the
production of marihuana and in the trafficking of its
resin, and Zahar had been chargeable for possession
of marihuana and might have had some kind of
involvement with its production. While not carrying
“the weight of actual convictions”, the judge found
they were “significant nonetheless in that they
demonstrate potential criminal involvement in
higher end illicit drug activities.” The judge also
accepted that the officer was well experienced and
trained in the area of drug transport investigations.
The judge used the officer’s training and experience
in assessing the value of the information and
observations that the officer had articulated in his
testimony.

Mooiman suggested that, as a passenger in a vehicle
stopped for traffic safety reasons, he had been
arbitrarily detained because the officer had used this
opportunity to ask him about his identification and
then check him on the CPIC and PIP databases.
Justice Caldwell, however, rejected this assertion.
“Only the driver of a vehicle is necessarily detained
by a traffic-safety stop,” he said. “In the absence of
some other suggestion of significant physical or
psychological restraint, a passenger of a vehicle that
is subject to a traffic-safety stop is simply a bystander
and is not detained for the purposes of s. 9 of the
Charter. ... Furthermore, it is also clear ... that the
police may engage in the preliminary questioning of
bystanders without giving rise to a detention under
ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter.” He continued:

Mooiman’s arrest for possessing the bag of
marihuana he voluntarily handed over was lawfully
made under s. 495(1)(b) of the Criminal Code. Since
Zahar knew about it and exercised control over it by
being the owner and operator of the truck, he was in
constructive possession of it. The search of the truck
was incident to the arrests of either Mooiman or
Zahar and had not been conducted in an
unreasonable manner. The evidence was admissible
and each man was convicted of possessing

“In the absence of some other
suggestion of significant physical or
psychological restraint, a passenger of
a vehicle that is subject to a trafficsafety stop is simply a bystander and is
not detained for the purposes of s. 9
of the Charter.”

PAGE 12

True, the effect of stopping a vehicle and
detaining the driver may impair the passenger’s
ability to proceed further, but—all other things

Volume 16 Issue 2 - March/April 2016

“[T]he effect of stopping a vehicle and detaining the driver may impair the passenger’s
ability to proceed further, but—all other things being neutral—nothing about a routine
traffic-safety stop prevents a passenger of the vehicle from simply walking away.”
being neutral—nothing about a routine trafficsafety stop prevents a passenger of the vehicle
from simply walking away. Similarly, absent a
legal requirement under The Traffic Safety Act,
the fact a passenger in a vehicle is necessarily
caught up by a traffic-safety stop does not
thereby legally compel or obligate the passenger
to comply with the investigating police officer’s
requests for information or assistance. This has
long been the case at common law. ...

What the PIP entries said:
SUBJECT: MOOIMAN
REG OWNER ZZZ PRODUCTION CANNABIS
CHARGED TRAFFICK - CANNABIS RESNN
300G#U

Axiomatically then, if a bystander later seeks to
allege that he or she had been arbitrarily
detained—and thereby compelled to answer
questions or to assist a police officer—the
bystander must show that he or she had been
effectively deprived of his or her liberty to
choose whether or not to engage in conversation
with or to cooperate with the officer. This is an
objective test whereby the bystander must
support his or her contention—i.e., that the
conduct of the police had effected a significant
deprivation of liberty—by reference to the
evidence before the court. [references omitted,
paras. 22-23]

SUBJECT: ZAHAR
General Information
ZAHAR
SHANE BELA
MALE, Born on [redacted]
SUSP CHGBLE POSSESSION - CANNABIS
30G#UNDER
OTHER ZZZPRODUCTION CANNABIS

In this case, Mooiman had not been detained prior
to the investigatory detention. The initial encounter
involved preliminary questioning falling short of
detention. It wasn’t until Mooiman had voluntarily
identified himself and the officer obtained the CPIC
and PIP information linking Mooiman to criminal
drug activity that the officer then proceeded to
detain him for investigatory purposes.

relevant to and formed part of the foundation of the
constable’s subjective suspicion, but, more
importantly, they may be assessed objectively in that
the entries may be adduced into evidence and
assessed by the court. Moreover, the constable’s
inquiries of these databases did not amount to a
search for the purposes of s. 8 of the Charter—as the
[accused] freshly allege on appeal—there being no
reasonable expectation of privacy in police
databases.”

Use of CPIC and PIP

Driver’s Detention & Arrest

The Court of Appeal noted that the PIP entries were
not records of convictions, but indicated to the
officer that both men had previous involvement with
drug activity. Nevertheless, the trial judge was
“entitled to make use of the CPIC and PIP entries in
his assessment of the circumstances and that, in that
assessment, the CPIC and PIP entries ‘demonstrate
potential criminal involvement in higher end illicit
drug activities’. The CPIC and PIP entries were

The driver too had been lawfully detained and
arrested. Initially, he had been lawfully detained
pursuant to the traffic-safety stop. This traffic
detention then transformed into an investigatory
detention and then an arrest once Mooiman
confirmed that Zahar knew about the bag of
marihuana. This provided the officer with reasonable
grounds to arrest Zahar under s. 495(1)(b) as being
in constructive possession of marihuana.

PAGE 13

Volume 16 Issue 2 - March/April 2016

The Truck Search
Justice Caldwell concluded that Mooiman, as a mere
passenger in the truck, did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in it and therefore his
personal rights under s. 8 of the Charter were not
engaged by its search. Mooiman did not own the
truck, was not found operating it and there was no
evidence he had made personal use of it, had
exercised any control over it or had regulated access
to it. Since Mooiman’s s. 8 rights were not engaged
by the search of the truck, his s. 8 rights could not be
violated by its search.
As for Zahar, he had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the truck as its owner and operator and,
therefore, his s. 8 rights were engaged. The search
however, was authorized as an incident to the arrest
of either him or Mooiman:

ENTRAPMENT	
 APPLICATION	
 
REJECTED:	
 POLICE	
 ACTED	
 ON	
 
REASONABLE	
 SUSPICION
R. v. Ayangma, 2016 PECA 6

In this case, the search of Mr. Zahar’s truck was
rationally connected to the offence for which
[the officer] had arrested both Mr. Mooiman and
Mr. Zahar. Its purpose was to locate or preserve
evidence relating to their possession of a
controlled substance. Although additional
reasonable and probable grounds were not
required in the circumstances, it could be said
that the search was founded upon a belief based
on reasonable grounds that an offence under s. 5
(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act
had been or was being committed. Nevertheless,
on the facts of this matter, the search in question
was undoubtedly “truly incidental” to the arrest
of either Mr. Mooiman or Mr. Zahar or both of
them. And, it was, for these reasons, a lawful
search that did not violate Mr. Zahar’s rights
under s. 8 of the Charter. [para. 42]

The police launched operation “Clean
Sweep” to disrupt the illicit drug trade
in Charlottetown. They utilized the
services of an agent under the control
of the police who made buys from
various mid to upper range drug trafficking targets,
the accused being one of them. There were nine
confidential informants and one casual confidential
informant. They provided information that the
accused was heavily involved in the drug trade and
was involving several other people to traffic for him.
The nine confidential informants had provided
information before which resulted in positive search
warrants and arrests, and the police believed them to
be reliable. As well, the accused had a record for
drug trafficking.

Since there were no ss. 8 or 9 breaches, a remedy
under s. 24(2) of was unavailable. The accuseds’
appeals were dismissed and their convictions were
upheld.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org

Sign up for the email list

www.10-8.ca

The agent used Facebook and text messages to
communicate with prospective sellers, including a
conversation with “Sabinairo Pepper” (the accused).
A Facebook conversation began after the agent sent
a “friend request” too the accused:
Accused: “what’s up”.
Agent: “Hard at it.... listin can u help me I need
play ball soft ball or hard ball don’t madder”.
The Accused: “Have we met”.

PAGE 14

Volume 16 Issue 2 - March/April 2016
The conversation continued with the agent offering
suggestions of how the accused knew him, but the
accused rejected each suggestion.
Agent: “ ... you may know me threw keegan to”
Accused: “No clue buddy keighan says he knows ya
but I don’t”.
Agent: “ Can u or him point me in a way to play
ball”.
Accused: “Waiting for my buddy to come down
from sside if you wanna wait till after supper he will
prob meet you”.
Agent: “Ill want a half o if he will”.
Accused: “Don’t think he...has that much”.
The agent then exchanged numerous text messages
with “Keegan” (later identified as John Scott)
arranging for a pick up. Surveillance officers
watched Scott get into the agent’s vehicle, then
followed it to another location where the agent gave
Scott $600 for drugs. Scott exited the agent’s car and
walked away to meet the accused. Scott then
returned to the car and gave the agent cocaine.
Three more scenarios followed over the next 10
days. During these scenarios, the accused sold
cocaine to the agent. The accused was charged with
one count of joint trafficking with Scott and three
additional counts of trafficking.

Prince Edward Island Supreme Court
The judge convicted the accused on all
four counts of trafficking. The accused
then argued that he was entrapped and
deserved a stay of proceedings on the
charges. In his view, the agent provided an
opportunity to commit a crime when the agent said,
“Hard at it.... listin can u help me I need play ball
soft ball or hard ball don’t madder”. The judge,
however, disagreed. He found the statement “listin
can u help me I need play ball soft ball or hard ball
don’t madder” was investigative language that did
not constitute the presentation of an opportunity to
commit a crime. “The question was essentially
whether [the accused] was willing to sell drugs to
the agent or not,” said the judge. “I find the
presentation of the opportunity did not occur until
the agent stated, “Ill want a half o if he will”.

The judge went on to conclude that when the
presentation to commit a crime was made, the
police had the necessary reasonable suspicion to do
so. “The nature of the information provided by the
informants was compelling, credible, and
corroborated,” said the judge. “The information
named suppliers, the places in which they operated,
individuals [the accused] sold to and used to sell
drugs for him, the kind of drugs sold, places at
which drugs were sold, cell phone numbers of
individuals involved, the frequency with which [the
accused] was involved, and various other pieces of
information.” The entrapment defence was rejected
and the convictions upheld. The accused was
sentenced to 30 months incarceration.

Prince Edward Island Court of Appeal
The accused appealed his
convictions asserting, among
other things, that the trial judge
erred in rejecting his
entrapment claim. In his opinion, the police did not
have a reasonable suspicion that he was involved in
trafficking drugs before providing him the
opportunity to commit the offence and therefore
they engaged in random virtue testing.

Entrapment
Justice Mitchell, speaking for the Court of Appeal,
described the underlying reasons for the doctrine of
entrapment this way:

PAGE 15

It is the belief that the administration of justice
must be kept free from disrepute that compels
recognition of the doctrine of entrapment. There
must not be judicial condonation of
unacceptable conduct by investigatory and
prosecutorial agencies. The state can only go so
far in investigating crime. Entrapment is a very
serious allegation against the state as it means
that state conduct violates our notion of fair play
and decency and shows a blatant disregard for
the qualities of humanness which all of us
share. The onus is on the accused to show on a
balance of probabilities that the conduct of the
state merits a stay of proceedings. A stay will be
granted only in the clearest of cases. [references
omitted, para. 33]

Volume 16 Issue 2 - March/April 2016

“Reasonable and probable grounds relate to the probability of criminal activity;
reasonable suspicion relates to the possibility of criminal activity. Reasonable suspicion is
an intermediate standard between suspicion and reasonable and probable
grounds. Reasonable and probable grounds will suffice to obtain a search warrant while a
reasonable suspicion will not. It is simply a matter of degree. To determine reasonable
suspicion the court must consider the constellation of objectively discernable facts.”
standard between suspicion and reasonable and
probable grounds. Reasonable and probable
grounds will suffice to obtain a search warrant
while a reasonable suspicion will not. It is
simply a matter of degree. To determine
reasonable suspicion the court must consider the
constellation of objectively discernable
facts. [para. 37]

Citing the Supreme Court of Canada judgment of R.
v. Mack, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 903, entrapment occurs
when:
(a) the authorities provide a person with an
opportunity to commit an offence without acting
on a reasonable suspicion that this person is
already engaged in criminal activity or pursuant
to a bona fide inquiry;
(b) although having such a reasonable suspicion or
acting in the course of a bona fide inquiry they
go beyond providing an opportunity and induce
the commission of an offence.

Thus, if the police have a reasonable suspicion that a
person is engaged in a criminal activity they can
provide that person with an opportunity to commit
the offence.

Was There Reasonable Suspicion?
There is a difference between suspicion, reasonable
suspicion, and reasonable and probable grounds.
Justice Mitchell stated:

Subjective only

The accused’s appeal on the entrapment issue was
dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org

Reasonable and probable grounds relate to the
probability of criminal activity; reasonable
suspicion relates to the possibility of criminal
activity. Reasonable suspicion is an intermediate

Suspicion

In this case, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial
judge that the reasonable suspicion standard had
been met. There was evidence providing a
reasonable suspicion of the accused’s participation
in drug trafficking. Furthermore, even though the
trial judge was correct in concluding the opening
comment by the agent was investigatory, rather than
an opportunity to commit a crime, this really did not
matter. This was not a random virtue testing case.
The police had reasonable suspicion to believe that
the accused was involved in the drug trade even
before the agent initiated contact with him.

Editor’s note: Additional facts taken from R. v.
Ayangma, 2015 PESC 19.

Reasonable
Suspicion

Reasonable
Belief

Subjective + facts =

Subjective + more facts =

Possibility of crime

Probability of crime

PAGE 16

Volume 16 Issue 1 - January/February 2016

PAGE 17

Volume 16 Issue 2 - March/April 2016

ASKING	
 IF	
 SOMEONE	
 CAN	
 
HOOK	
 A	
 PERSON	
 UP	
 WITH	
 
DRUGS	
 IS	
 NOT,	
 BY	
 ITSELF,	
 
ENTRAPMENT
R. v. Le, 2016 BCCA 155
The police received a phone number
of a suspected dial-a-dope drug
trafficker from a Crime Stoppers tip.
The tip reported that a male person
with a strong Asain accent monitored
a specific cell phone number and sold drugs in
Surrey, BC. Six months later an officer called the
number as part of an undercover operation targeting
dial-a-dope operations. The man who answered the
phone had a thick Asian accent. The the officer
asked “Can you hook me up?” When the man
responded positively, the officer then asked if the
man could provide him with an eight ball of
cocaine. When the man said he could, the officer
then asked how much it would cost and was told
$200. The two agreed to meet in Surrey. The man
said he would be driving a white Honda Prelude.
When they met, the officer approached the driver
side of the Prelude and had a conversation with the
lone occupant in the driver’s seat, an Asian male. He
asked the man if he had “the stuff”. The man showed
the officer a package of cigarettes. When the officer
asked to see the drugs, the man opened the package
and showed him a single rock of crack cocaine. The
officer looked into the package and saw the
remainder of the drugs. The man was given $200
and the officer received the cigarette package. As the
Prelude left, the vehicle was stopped within minutes
of leaving the scene of the drug purchase and its
driver, the accused, was arrested. The accused was
searched and police found $40 cash and a cell
phone on him. As well, the $200 the officer used to
buy the drugs (confirmed by serial numbers) was
seized from the front passenger seat of the Prelude .

British Columbia Supreme Court
The accused was convicted of trafficking
in cocaine. However, he brought a
motion for a stay of proceedings on the
basis of entrapment. He submitted that

the police essentially made a cold call and did not
have a reasonable suspicion prior to offering an
opportunity to commit the offence. The judge,
however, held that the question, “Can you hook me
up?” was not providing an opportunity to commit an
offence. He concluded that the police, acting on a
Crime Stoppers tip and receiving a positive response
to “Can you hook me up?”, had reasonable
suspicion. Therefore, the accused had not
demonstrated that he was entrapped:
In this case, [the officer] clearly engaged in the
preliminaries of a drug transaction while
arranging to meet and then meeting the accused.
Whatever level of suspicion the police had in
this particular investigation before the phone call
being made was raised to reasonable suspicion
by the positive response of this accused. Indeed,
his response raised the suspicion to a level of
reasonable suspicion and it allowed [the officer]
to request the sale of an eight ball of cocaine,
the price of which was set by the accused. The
sale of drugs at an agreed meeting followed.
[2014 BCSC 2207, para. 27]

British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused suggested, among
other things, that the trial judge
erred in finding that he was not
entrapped. The accused argued
that the trial misapprehended the evidence because
the officer asked “Can you hook me up with an eight
ball?”, and not merely “Can you hook me up?” In his
view, this made a difference in his entrapment claim.

Entrapment
Justice Bennett, writing the Court of Appeal’s
judgment, reviewed the law of entrapment and
noted the following:
• Entrapment is a defence that must be
established by an accused on a balance of
probabilities, only after conviction.
• Entrapment occurs when

PAGE 18

‣ the authorities provide a person with an
opportunity to commit an offence without

Volume 16 Issue 2 - March/April 2016
the phone call raised a reasonable suspicion.
Afterwards, a deal was struck in person. In my
view, asking someone if he can “hook a person
up with drugs” is not, in and of itself,
entrapment.

acting on a reasonable suspicion that this
person is already engaged in criminal activity
or pursuant to a bona fide inquiry.
‣ although having such a reasonable suspicion
or acting in the course of a bona fide inquiry,
they go beyond providing an opportunity
and induce the commission of an offence.

In this case, Justice Bennett found that it made no
difference whether the officer added “with an eight
ball” or “an eight ball of cocaine” after his initial
request to be “hooked up”. She stated:

Defence counsel argued that there is a
meaningful distinction between veiled
statements asking if the other party is a drug
dealer and more specific requests for types,
quantities, or values of drugs. It was argued that
the former statement is an investigatory step
while the latter is an offer to commit an offence.
Parsing the language of undercover drugs calls in
dial-a-dope investigations in this way takes an
unnecessarily narrow approach. It ignores the
surrounding circumstances, but more
importantly, it strays far from the core principle
underlying Mack.
...
Objectively speaking, innocent and otherwise
l aw - a b i d i n g i n d iv i d u a l s wo u l d n o t b e
“manipulated” or tempted to enter the
dangerous and illicit drug trade if asked by a
stranger over the phone to sell him drugs. It
defies common sense to suggest that asking
whether an individual is willing to sell specific
types, quantities, or values of illicit drugs runs
the “serious unnecessary risk” that an otherwise
innocent person would then go out, procure the
drugs, meet with and sell them to a stranger.

First, the police had reasonable suspicion when
the call was answered: (i) they had a Crime
Stoppers tip containing details about the phone
number used, the suspected dealer’s gender,
ethnicity and territory of operation, (ii) aspects of
the tip were confirmed when the telephone was
answered by an Asian-sounding male, and
(iii) there was evidence of “Swan checks” that
the defence did not pursue.

Third, [the officer’s] phone call did not amount
t o e n t ra p m e n t g ive n t h e a n a l y s i s a n d
conclusions in Swan. The call was not part of
hundreds of random calls, like Swan, but fell
within a bona fide investigation or inquiry,
having regard to the difficulty of investigating
dial-a-dope offences and not confining dial-adope to a known location because of the mobile
nature of the crime. {paras. 91-96]

Second, even if there was not reasonable
suspicion, this minimal conversation can only
amount to part of the investigation of the tip to
see if the target responded. It was not an
opportunity to commit a crime. [The accused’s]
own expression of willingness to transact during

The police conduct did not amount to entrapment
and the accused’s appeal was dismissed.

• The requirement for either a reasonable
suspicion that the person is engaged in illegal
activity or a bona fide inquiry is to avoid the risk
that the police will attract people who would
not otherwise commit a crime.
• It is not a proper use of police power to “test the
virtue of people on a random basis”.
• When there is a bona fide investigation, the
police may offer individuals they encounter in
the course of that investigation the
“opportunity” to commit a crime, even if they
do not have reasonable suspicion that individual
was engaged in criminal activity.

Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca

“In my view, asking someone if he can “hook a person up with drugs” is not, in and of
itself, entrapment.”
PAGE 19

Volume 16 Issue 2 - March/April 2016

POLICING	
 ACROSS	
 CANADA:	
 
FACTS	
 &	
 FIGURES

Canada’s Police Officers by City - Top 10
CMA

According to a recent report
released by Statistics Canada,
there were 68,777 active police
officers across Canada in 2015.
This represented a decrease of
29 officers from the previous
year. Ontario had the most police officers at 26,205,
while the Yukon had the least at 130. With a national
population of 35,851,774, Canada’s average cop per
pop ratio was 192 police officers per 100,000 residents.
Source: Statistics Canada, Police Resources in Canada,
2015, Catalogue no: 85-225-X, March 2016

Officers

% Change

Number

per 100,000

2014>2015

Toronto, ON

5,425

193

+0.4%

Montreal, QC

4,638

233

-0.9%

Calgary, AB

2,147

170

-0.7%

Peel Region, ON

1,951

144

-0.3%

Edmonton, AB

1,665

179

-2.5%

York Region, ON

1,535

137

+0.1%

Winnipeg, MB

1,422

200

-5.0%

Vancouver, BC

1,280

197

-2.9%

Ottawa, ON

1,272

134

-3.4%

Durham Region, ON

866

133

-1.0%

CANADA: By the Numbers
Royal Newfoundland Constabulary
393

Total population: 35,851,774

2015

Quebec Provincial Police
5,555
YK
130

BC
8,678

Ontario Provincial Police
6,137

NWT
201

NU
131

NL
889

AB
7,155
SK
2,286

MB
2,602

ON
26,205

QC
16,011

PEI
226

NB
1,278

In 2014 the total expenditure on policing was

$13,882,289,000
PAGE 20

NS
1,855

RCMP ‘HQ’ &
Training Academy

1,130

Volume 16 Issue 2 - March/April 2016

2014	
 FAST	
 FACTS
• On the snapshot day of May 15, 2015 there
were 68,777 police officers in Canada. There
were an additional 28,368 civilians, which
represented 29% of all police personnel. There
were 2.4 officers for every civilian employed.
• Saskatchewan had the highest provincial rate of
police strength at 202 officers per 100,000
residents (cop to pop ratio) followed closely by
Manitoba at 201 officers per 100,000. The
Northwest Territories had the highest territorial
cop to pop ratio at 456 officers per 100,000.
• 54.5% of police officers were 40 years of age or
older.
• 17.9% of officers were over the age of 50.
• For municipal police services serving a
population of 100,000 or more, Victoria B.C.
had the highest police strength at 240 officers
per 100,000, followed by Montreal, QC (233)
and Halifax, NS (218). Richmond, BC had the
lowest police strength at 97 officers per
100,000.
• For 2014/2015, 80% of officers hired were
recruits. The remainder were experienced police
officers.
• In May 2015 there were 14,332 female police
officers in Canada. This represents 20.8% of all
officers and is a +1.3% increase over 2014.
• Women represented 67.8% of civilians
employed by police services.
• Police expenditures continue to rise, more than
doubling since 2000.
• Per capita costs for policing in fiscal 2014/2015
translated to $391 per Canadian.
• Provincial police services in Ontario, Quebec
and Newfoundland cost $2.1 billion.
• Stand alone municipal services cost $7.3 billion.
• The total operating costs for the RCMP
amounted to $4.5 billion.

Top 10 Retirement Eligible
Municipal Police Services
Municipal Police Service

Eligible to Retire %

St. John’s, NL

33.4%

Winnipeg, MB

23.9%

Codiac Region (Moncton) NB

22.8%

Victoria, BC

21.0%

Hamilton, ON

20.6%

Montreal, QC

17.9%

Coquitlam, BC

14.6%

Kelowna, BC

11.2%

Langley Township, BC

10.1%

RETIREMENT
At the end of the 2014/2015, 11% of police
officers were eligible to retire. Newfoundland had
the highest proportion of officers that could retire
at 23%. 48% of officers at RCMP Headquarters
and the Training Academy could retire.

PAGE 21

BC	
 Law	
 Enforcement	
 

Memorial
Sunday,	
 September	
 25,	
 2016	
 

at	
 1:00	
 pm

Brockton	
 Oval,	
 Stanley	
 Park	
 
Vancouver,	
 British	
 Columbia

Volume 16 Issue 2 - March/April 2016

RCMP

RCMP On-Strength Establishment
The RCMP is Canada’s largest police
organization. It is divided into 15 Divisions
with Headquarters in Ottawa. Each
division is managed by a commanding
officer and is designated alphabetically.

RCMP DIVISIONS
Division

Area

Depot

Regina, SK (Training Academy)

National

National Capital Region

B

Newfoundland & Labrador

C

Quebec

D

Manitoba

E

British Columbia

F

Saskatchewan

G

Northwest Territories

H

Nova Scotia

J

New Brunswick

K

Alberta

L

as of September 1, 2015

Rank

#	
 of	
 positions

Commissioner

1

Deputy Commissioners

7

Assistant Commissioners

26

Chief Superintendents

58

Superintendents

179

Inspectors

348

Corps Sergeant Major

1

Sergeants Major

1

Staff Sergeants Major

13

Staff Sergeants

812

Sergeants

1,923

Corporals

3,377

Constables

11,491

Special Constables

55

Prince Edward Island

Civilian Members

3,838

M

Yukon Territory

Public Servants

6,331

O

Ontario

Total

V

Nunavut Territory

Source: www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/about-ausujet/organi-eng.htm

28,461

RCMP Officers by Level of Policing - Canada 2015 (numbers do not include 1,130 members at HQ & Training Academy)
Level / Region

BC

AB

SK

MN

ON

QC

NB

NS

PEI

NL

YK

NWT

NU

Total

Contract

5,265

2,596

988

815

-

-

688

810

102

401

112

181

116

12,074

Federal &
other policing

879

350

257

198

1,654

935

153

182

27

95

18

20

15

4,783

Total

6,144

2,946

1,245

1,013

1,654

935

841

992

129

496

130

201

131

16,857

PAGE 22

Volume 14 Issue 6 - November/December 2014

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