POLICE ACADEMY

715 McBride Blvd. New Westminster B.C. V3L 5T4

IN SERVICE:10-8
A PEER READ PUBLICATION
A newsletter devoted to operational police officers across British Columbia.

IN MEMORIAL
On May 23, 2003, 49year-old
Ontario
Provincial Police Senior
Constable Phil Shrive
died in hospital as a
result of injuries he
sustained in an on duty
two-vehicle collision that occurred on May 16,
2003.

force and is survived by his wife
Kathy and their 3-year-old
daughter Emilie.
The above information was
provided with the permission of
the Officer Down Memorial Page: available at
www.odmp.org/canada

NEW STAFF MEMBERS AT
POLICE ACADEMY

Constable Shrive began his policing career with
the OPP in 1974. His most recent postings
included West Carleton Detachment and upon its
closing, he transferred to Renfrew Detachment in
1999.

The Police Academy is pleased
to announce the arrival of a
new firearms instructor and a
new legal studies instructor to
its recruit training staff.

Senior Constable Shrive was a dedicated officer
who was well liked and respected by his peers and
members of the community. He was also a Branch
President
of
the
Ontario
Provincial Police Association
working diligently on behalf of
his fellow officers. He is
survived by his wife and 4
children.

Sgt. Dave Schmirler is a 17-year police veteran
who started his police career in 1986 with the
New Westminster Police Service. He transferred
to the Abbotsford Police Department in 1995. He
has been a tactical unit operator (ERT) for 15years with both New Westminster and
Abbotsford and is the founding member and first
serving president of the British Columbia Tactical
Officers Association. Sgt. Schmirler has been a
competitive IPSC shooter in the past and has
been a firearm’s trainer and transition instructor
for about 12 years. Prior to coming to the Police
Academy he was assigned as a Detective to the
General Investigative Section in Abbotsford and
has prior experience in the Drug Section, Street
Crime Unit, and as a certified Field Training
Officer.

On June 10, 2003, 35-year-old RCMP Constable
Ghislain Maurice of the Strathcona County RCMP
Detachment in Edmonton, Alberta died just
before 9 a.m. when his unmarked police cruiser
collided with a gravel truck. The accident
happened on Highway 21, just southeast of
Sherwood Park. The driver of the truck was not
seriously hurt.
Cst. Maurice was on duty as a member of the
detachment's Traffic Services Unit at the time
of his death. He was a 14-year veteran of the

Volume 3 Issue 4
May/June 2003

Sgt. Kelly Seib is a 10-year police officer who
started her career in 1993 with the Delta Police
Department. Prior to policing she lived on
Vancouver Island where she taught Middle School

in the Saanich School District. Sgt. Seib recently
completed a four-year Detective assignment in
the General Investigation Unit where she
specialized in investigations pertaining to Sexual
Assaults and Child Abuse. She also Coordinated
the Department’s Violent Crimes Linkage Analysis
System (ViCLAS) throughout her tenure as a
Detective.
Welcome aboard!!!

QUALITY & CLARITY OF
VIDEO IMAGES RAISES A
REASONABLE DOUBT
R. v. Moyou, 2003 BCPC 0063
Following a bank robbery, the
police created wanted posters
using images of the suspect
obtained
from
the
bank’s
surveillance
videotapes
that
recorded the incident. As a consequence, three
correctional officers recognized the suspect in
the wanted posters as the accused. A photograph
of the accused taken at the time of his release
from the correctional facility was then used by
the police in a photo line up and was shown to the
employees of the bank. The line up consisted of 6
photos presented as a package and the accused
was the only native person in the line up. Four of
seven employees shown the line up selected the
accused in varying degrees of certainty and a
robbery charge was laid against the accused. At
trial, the accused denied the robbery. However,
all four employees made in-court identifications
of him and the correctional officers identified
the accused from the videotaped images shown in
court. No circumstantial or forensic evidence was
presented. Thus, identification became the sole
issue.
The Crown’s case of identification relied on the
following:
•

the identification by the parole officers of
the person in the wanted posters;

Volume 3 Issue 4
May/June 2003

•

the photo line up identification by the four
bank employees; and

•

the identification of the accused by the bank
employees and the correctional employees
from the videotape images shown at trial.

British Columbia Provincial Court Justice Yee
found there was a reasonable doubt respecting
the identity of the accused as the perpetrator of
the robbery. His identification as the robber was
made from a correctional photograph, not from
the videotape image itself. If the correctional
officers were wrong about their recognition of
the accused from the wanted posters, the
identification chain would be broken and the
photo line up evidence would be meaningless.
Although there was no doubt that the
correctional officers were honest and many of
the features of the robber in the video and the
accused’s photo used in the line up were similar,
the quality and clarity of the videotape images
left a reasonable doubt in the Court’s view.
Justice Yee stated:
The videotape captured mostly an overview of
staggered images of the robbery. Most of the
recorded images were out of focus. For the most
part, the recording of the interactions between
the robber and the bank tellers coincide with the
numberings on the videotape and thus made it very
difficult to see. Other than five waist high shots
of the robber, there were no close up shots on the
face. Of those five shots, only three could possibly
be used for identification purposes. Furthermore,
the robber was wearing a baseball-cap which not
only covered up the forehead but also caused a
shadow over the eyes and parts of his face. All
these make identification of the robber from the
images on the videotape exceedingly difficult.
Since the pictures in the wanted poster came from
the videotape images, the difficulty persists.
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca

Note-able Quote
Admission of ignorance is often the first step in
our education—Dr. Stephen R. Covey

2

2004 POLICE LEADERSHIP
CONFERENCE
APRIL 5-7, 2004
Mark your calendar! The British
Columbia Association of Chief's
of Police, as the major sponsor,
along with the Ministry of Public
Safety and Solicitor General and
the Justice Institute of British Columbia will be
hosting the "Police Leadership 2004 Conference"
April 5 to 7, 2004 at the Westin Bayshore in
beautiful Vancouver, British Columbia.
The conference will emphasize leadership as an
activity, not a position, and provide an opportunity
for participants of all ranks from police agencies
across Canada, the United States, and beyond to
involve themselves in leadership initiatives. A
carefully chosen list of speakers will provide a
first class opportunity to hear some of the
world's outstanding authorities on leadership.
For more updates on this conference as they
develop, please bookmark:
www.policeleadership.org

NEW (PROPOSED)
LAWS UPDATE
There are several new Bills
before Parliament that may
impact police officers and how
we do our job. These Bills include
C-32 and C-38.

Bill C-32 (first reading only: April 11, 2003)
Use of Force on Aircraft
A
new
law
has
been
introduced that would permit
the use of force by persons
(pilots, staff, or passengers) on an aircraft to use
reasonable force to prevent the commission of an
offence that would likely injure the aircraft or a
person or property on board it:

Volume 3 Issue 4
May/June 2003

s.27.1 Criminal Code (proposed)
(1) Every person on an aircraft in flight is justified in
using as much force as is reasonably necessary to
prevent the commission of an offence against this
Act or another Act of Parliament that the person
believes on reasonable grounds, if it were
committed, would be likely to cause immediate and
serious injury to the aircraft or to any person or
property therein.
(2) This section applies in respect of any aircraft in
flight in Canadian airspace and in respect of any
aircraft registered in Canada in accordance with the
regulations made under the Aeronautics Act in
flight outside Canadian airspace.

Application for Weapons Warrant to Seize
In response to the Ontario Court of appeal ruling
in R. v. Hurrell (2002) Docket:C36968 (OntCA)
finding
s.117.04
of
the
Criminal Code
unconstitutional, a newly worded section has been
proposed. In the current wording of the Code,
the section does not require reasonable grounds
to believe that weapons or other items sought are
likely to be found on the person or premises o be
searched. In the proposed new section, the
justice requires reasonable grounds to believe
that a person possesses one
of the specified items in a
building, receptacle, or place
and it is not desirable for
them to possess the items.
s.117.04(1) Criminal Code (proposed)
Where, pursuant to an application made by a peace
officer with respect to any person, a justice is
satisfied by information on oath that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the person
possesses a weapon, a prohibited device, ammunition,
prohibited ammunition or an explosive substance in a
building, receptacle or place and that it is not desirable
in the interests of the safety of the person, or of any
other person, for the person to possess the weapon,
prohibited device, ammunition, prohibited ammunition
or explosive substance, the justice may issue a warrant
authorizing a peace officer to search the building,
receptacle or place and seize any such thing, and any
authorization, licence or registration certificate
relating to any such thing, that is held by or in the
possession of the person.

3

Subsection (2) remains unchanged. Warrantless
searches in exigent circumstances are still
permissible provided the pre-conditions in
s.117.04(1) are satisfied.

Traps Likely to Cause Bodily Harm
A new section outlawing
the use of deadly traps in
places used to commit
offences
has
been
introduced in parliament.
Canada’s Minister of Justice Martin Cauchon
stated:
We have to protect emergency workers like fire
fighters on the front line who may be exposed to
dangerous situations like marijuana grow operations
or clandestine drug labs. The nature of these
criminal activities creates a risk of fire, with
volatile chemicals used in drug labs and electric
power stolen through unsafe meter bypasses. If
fire fighters or police officers are put at risk,
injured or killed by traps set to defend these
criminal enterprises from law enforcement or rival
gangs, those who set the traps must feel the full
weight of the law.
s.247 Criminal Code (proposed)
(1) Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and is
liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five
years, who with intent to cause death or bodily harm
to a person, whether ascertained or not, (a ) sets or
places a trap, device or other thing that is likely to
cause death or bodily harm to a person; or (b ) being
in occupation or possession of a place, knowingly
permits such a trap, device or other thing to remain
in that place.
(2) Every one who commits an offence under subsection
(1) and thereby causes bodily harm to any other
person is guilty of an indictable offence and liable
to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years.
(3) Every one who commits an offence under subsection
(1), in a place kept or used for the purpose of
committing another indictable offence, is guilty of
an indictable offence and is liable to a term of
imprisonment not exceeding ten years.
(4) Every one who commits an offence under subsection
(1), in a place kept or used for the purpose of
committing another indictable offence, and thereby
causes bodily harm to a person is guilty of an

Volume 3 Issue 4
May/June 2003

indictable offence and liable to a term of
imprisonment not exceeding fourteen years.
(5) Every one who commits an offence under subsection
(1) and thereby causes the death of any other
person is guilty of an indictable offence and liable
to imprisonment for life.

Bill C-38 (first reading only: May 27, 2003)
Several amendments to the
Controlled
Drugs
and
Substances Act (CDSA) have
also been introduced. These
proposed
changes
include
reducing
the
maximum
punishment, by fine only, and the possibility of
“ticketing” processes for minor marihuana
possession offences. Penalties for growing
marihuana would be increased. Canada’s Minister
of Justice Martin Cauchon stated:
These legislative reforms will ensure that our
possession laws can be enforced more effectively
across Canada while at the same time toughen
penalties against cannabis grow operators. Our
message to Canadians and especially our young
people is clear - marijuana is harmful and it will
remain illegal.

Production Offences
In its bid to toughen
penalties against marihuana
growers,
Parliament
is
proposing to double the
current maximum sentence
(proposed s.7(2) CDSA).
Under the present law of
producing marihuana (which
includes
cultivating,
propagating, or harvesting
the substance), a convicted
grower can only receive a maximum of 7 years in
prison. Under the new proposal, maximum
sentences are based on the number of marihuana
plants grown. The following sentencing grid shows
the corresponding penalty attached to the
number of plants:

4

1-3

Offence type
Summary only

4-25

Dual

26-50
51+

Indictable
Indictable

# of plants

Punishment
< $5000 fine and/or
< 1 year in prison
by indictment
• < 5 yrs. prison
by summary
• < $25,000 and/or
• < 18 months prison
< 10 yrs. prison
< 14 yrs. prison

Possession Offences
This new legislation will “de-criminalize”, but not
“de-legalize”, possession of small amounts of
marihuana. Therefore, enforcement action can still
be taken. Possession of amounts less than 30 grms.
of marihuana or less than 1 gram of hashish remain
summary conviction only offences. However,
maximum penalties for these offences have been
reduced in some cases.
Offence
s.4(5) CDSA
summary only
s.4(5.1) CDSA
summary only
s.4(5.2) CDSA
summary only

s.4(5.4) CDSA
summary only

Drug Amount
hashish
< 1 grm.
marihuana
< 15 grms.
If
person
in
possession of < 1
grm. of hashish
or < 15 grms. of
marihuana
is
operating or in
care & control of
a
• motor vehicle
• railway equip.

• aircraft, or
• vessel
marihuana
more than 15
grms., but not
more than 30
grms.

Max. punishment
Adult = $300 fine
YO = $200 fine
Adult = $150 fine
YO = $100 fine
Adult = $400 fine
YO = $250 fine

Sentencing Reasons
A new section will place an affirmative duty on
judges in some cases to justify why a person is
not sent to jail (proposed s.10(2.1) CDSA). If an
accused is convicted of a production offence
where 4 or more plants are involved, but is not
sentenced to imprisonment, the Court must give
reasons why if:
•
•

•
•

the accused used real property belonging to a
3rd party to commit the offence;
the production was a potential security,
health, or safety hazard to children at the
location or in the immediate area;
the production was a potential public safety
hazard in a residential area; or
the location was set with a trap or other
device likely to cause death or bodily harm.

Complete copies of these and other proposed
Bills are available at www.parl.gc.ca

TAXI PASSENGER NOT
NECESSARILY DETAINED WHEN
DRIVER STOPPED
Option
< $1000 fine and/
or 6 months in
prison

Contraventions
Act process:
Adult = $300 fine
YO = $200 fine

Marihuana amounts in excess of 30 grams or
hashish amounts in excess of 1 gram will continue

Volume 3 Issue 4
May/June 2003

to be a dual offence. If possession of these
amounts proceeds by indictment, the maximum
punishment available is imprisonment for a term
not exceeding 5 years less a day. If the offence
is proceeded summarily, a first offence can draw
up to 6 months in prison and/or a $1000 fine
while a second or subsequent offences can bring
up to one year in prison and/or a $2000 fine.

R. v. Charles,
[2003] O.J. N0. 1186 (OntCJ)
Two police officers were on
patrol in an area known for drug
transactions when they observed
a male (not the accused) enter a
taxi facing the wrong way on a
one-way street and the taxi drive off, going the
wrong way. The police followed the cab and
stopped it a short distance away. As the driver

5

got out of the vehicle he was told to get back in.
As police approached the tax, they noticed the
accused, a passenger, reach into his waistband. In
response to the question what he was doing in
town, the accused replied he was with his buddy.
He verbally identified himself when requested
and his cell phone, which flashed several times,
went unanswered. He would just hang up
repeatedly.
Before a CPIC return on the accused’s
identification, he was asked whether he had any
outstanding charges. The accused replied he was
recently released from jail for possession of
cocaine and careless driving. At this point, the
accused was arrested for possession of a
narcotic, read his rights to counsel and provided
the caution. He stated he had an “8-ball”, but
that he had swallowed it. The accused was
searched and drugs were found. The accused ran
from police but was tackled a short distance
away. While trying to subdue him, the officer put
the drugs down. The accused took the drugs,
placed them his mouth, and tried to swallow. The
officer grabbed him so he could not swallow. This
to prevent the accused from dying and to
preserve the evidence.
The accused brought an application in the Ontario
Court of Justice seeking the evidence
(statements made and crack cocaine seized) be
excluded under s.24(2) of the Charter. He argued
that his rights under s.8 (search and seizure), s.9
(arbitrary detention), and s.10(b) (right to
counsel) had been violated.

Was there a Detention
Justice Mocha of the Ontario Court of Justice
concluded that the accused, a passenger in the
taxi, was not detained, either physically or
psychologically. There were no demands or
threats made to him; he was simply asked
questions in a polite and non-intimidating manner.
“Although [the accused] was being questioned by
a police officer, there was nothing about the
circumstances, the manner in which he was

Volume 3 Issue 4
May/June 2003

questioned, or the officer’s behaviour that
indicated he had assumed control over the
movements of [the accused].” The taxi driver was
stopped by police for a Highway Traffic Act
offence and “the stopping of the driver does not
equate to detention of a passenger unless there is
something more to indicate detention.”
Since there was no detention, there was no
obligation to inform the accused of his right to
counsel prior to his arrest nor was it necessary to
assess its arbitrariness. Even if there had been a
detention, it would not have been arbitrary
because the officer had an articulable cause.

The Search
Justice Mocha concluded that the search was
reasonable and did not constitute a s.8 Charter
violation:
That leads me to the section 8 argument which is
that [the officer] did not have objectively
reasonable grounds to believe [the accused] was in
possession of a narcotic and therefore the arrest
was unlawful. I find the totality of the
circumstances provide objectively reasonably
grounds for a lawful arrest. They include: the
location being a well-known drug area, the unusual
movements of the taxi, the gesture to the
waistband, the cell phone and the prior record for
possession of a narcotic. I find the arrest was
lawful and the search incident to that arrest was
reasonable. The fact that [the officer] did not
search his waistband first does not cause me
concern about his credibility nor does it affect the
reasonableness of the search. I also find that the
questioning by [the officer] did not constitute a
search. Consequently, there has been no violation
of the applicant's rights under section 8 of the
Charter.

DID YOU KNOW…
…that s. 7 of British
Columbia’s
Offence Act
requires the police to
provide a person taken into
custody to at least one
private telephone call, on

6

their request, during the first 12 hours of their
custody. This "one call" does not appear to be
limited to counsel, but might include other
persons the arrestee wishes to communicate with.
s.7 Offence Act
(1) Every person who is taken into custody by a peace
officer is entitled, on request to the person
responsible for his or her custody, to have access
to, and the private use of, a telephone as soon as
possible at least once during the first 12 hours of
his or her custody.
(2) A person who, without reasonable excuse, hinders
or prevents a person in custody from exercising
the right granted by subsection (1), commits an
offence.

CLASS 90 GRADUATES
The Police Academy is pleased to
announce the successful graduation
of recruit Class 90 as qualified
municipal constables on May 9,
2003.
DELTA
Cst. Jody Ackerman
Cst. Russell Eke
Cst. Kevin Hilliard
Cst. Garth Hoffman
Cst. Lauren Koop
Cst. James Sanberg
Cst. Harbinder Sidhu

NEW WESTMINSTER
Cst. Robert Boyd

WEST VANCOUVER
Cst. Brian Wong

recruit

VANCOUVER
Cst. Melissa Apcar
Cst. Stuart Black
Cst. Kenneth Fincham
Cst. James Hooper
Cst. Lisa Horne
Cst. Jonathan Kempton
Cst. Mike Loeppky
Cst. Scott Maden
Cst. Troy Peters
Cst. Tracey Prentice
Cst. Michael Ritchie
Cst. Shawn Robson
Cst. Aman Samra
Cst. Kenneth Stanworth
Cst. Jason Tremblay
Cst. Norman Yee

Congratulations to Cst. Garth
Hoffman (Delta), who was the
recipient of the British Columbia
Association of Chiefs of Police
Shield of Merit for best all around
performance in basic training. Cst.

Volume 3 Issue 4
May/June 2003

Hoffman also received the Abbotsford Police
Association
Oliver
Thomson
Trophy
for
outstanding physical fitness. Cst. Kenneth
Stanworth (Vancouver) received the Vancouver
Police Union Excellence in Academics award for
best academic test results in all disciplines. Cst.
Shawn Robson (Vancouver) received the British
Columbia
Federation
of
Police
Officers
Valedictorian award for being selected by his
peers to represent his class at the graduation
ceremony. Cst. James Sandberg (Delta) was the
recipient of the Abbotsford Police Recruit
Marksmanship award for highest qualification
score during Block 3 training (48/50). Mr. Dirk
Ryneveld, Q.C., the British Columbia Police
Complaint Commissioner, was the keynote speaker
at the ceremony.

FAILING TO ASK ABOUT
SUCCESS IN CONTACTING
COUNSEL VIOLATES CHARTER
RIGHT
R. v. Rezanoff, 2003 ABQB 292
The accused was arrested for
impaired care and control, and
consuming alcohol in a vehicle
after a police officer saw him
sitting in the driver’s seat of a semi trailer truck,
start it, and turn the lights on. He was informed
of his right to counsel, cautioned, and read the
breath demand. The accused agreed to accompany
the officer to the police station so he could seek
advice from a lawyer. At the station the accused
asked to speak to a lawyer and was brought to a
telephone room where he remained for 7 minutes.
The officer saw him on the phone part of this
time and when he was finished, the accused was
escorted to the breathalyzer room where he
refused to provide a breath sample. At trial in
Alberta Provincial Court, the accused was
convicted of failing to provide a breath sample.
The accused appealed to the Alberta Court of
Queen’s Bench arguing that his s.10(b) Charter

7

right to counsel had been breached because he
did not get legal advice from a lawyer during the
7 minute period. Section 10 requires that once an
arrestee indicates a desire to contact a lawyer,
the police must provide a reasonable opportunity
to do so and must also refrain from eliciting
evidence until the opportunity has been provided.
Justice Macklin accepted the accused’s argument,
stating:

s.10(b) had been infringed and the evidence of
the refusal was inadmissible. The appeal was
allowed and an acquittal entered.

In the particular circumstances of this case, I am
satisfied
that
seven
minutes
in
a
telephone room at 1: 20 a. m. is not a reasonable
opportunity to exercise one's right to contact
counsel. The first implementational duty [providing
a reasonable opportunity] was breached, and an
infringement of the [accused’s] rights has been
made out. I am also satisfied that the [accused]
was as reasonably diligent as he could be during
that time span in trying to call a lawyer or someone
who could provide him with the advice he was
seeking.

Sgt. Mike Novakowski

Given the peculiar circumstances of this case and
the brief period the appellant had to
contact counsel and both instruct and obtain
advice
from
counsel,
[the
officer]
should have, at the very least, asked the appellant
at 1: 27 if he was successful in contacting a lawyer
or obtaining advice. …. In this case, as I have
stated, the [accused] did not have a reasonable
opportunity to contact counsel. Had [the arresting
officer] simply asked the question as to whether
counsel had been contacted, he could then have
taken steps to ensure that a reasonable
opportunity to do so was then afforded to the
[accused]. [references omitted]

And further:
In this case, [the arresting officer] did not ask
whether
counsel
had
been
contacted.
Had he done so, he could have determined whether
or not further reasonable opportunity must be
given or, alternatively, whether the [accused] was
waiving his right to counsel, which would have
triggered the additional informational requirement
[of the police obligation to hold off from eliciting
incriminatory evidence].

The accused had established on a balance of
probabilities that his right protected under

Volume 3 Issue 4
May/June 2003

Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca

s.495 CRIMINAL CODE POLICE
POWERS OF ARREST IN
REVIEW
The Criminal Code defines a peace officer in s.2:
"peace officer" includes…(c) a
police officer, police constable,
bailiff, constable, or other
person
employed
for
the
preservation and maintenance of
the public peace or for the
service or execution of civil
process,

This section does not create a police force, but
provides that persons deriving their authority
from other sources be treated as "peace officers"
enabling them to enforce the Criminal Code within
the scope of their pre-existing authority and to
benefit from certain protections granted only to
peace officers1. The general power of arrest for
peace officers is found in section 495(1) of the
Criminal Code:
s.495(1) Criminal Code
A peace officer may arrest without warrant
(a) a person who has committed an indictable
offence or who, on reasonable grounds, he
believes has committed or is about to commit an
indictable offence;
(b) a person whom he finds committing a criminal
offence; or
(c) a person in respect of whom he has reasonable
grounds to believe that a warrant of arrest or
committal, in any form set out in Part XXVIII in
relation thereto, is in force within the
territorial jurisdiction in which the person is
found.

1

Nolan v. the Queen (1987) 34 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (S.C.C.) at p.298.

8

By application of the Interpretation Act, this
power of arrest extends to all federal statutes
that create offences, but do not create their own
arrest powers2:
s.34(2) Interpretation Act
All the provisions of the Criminal Code relating to
indictable offences apply to indictable offences
created by an enactment, and all the provisions of that
Code relating to summary conviction offences apply to
all other offences created by an enactment, except to
the extent that the enactment otherwise provides.

For example, the Controlled Drugs and Substances
Act (CDSA) creates many drug related offences
however there are no arrest powers within the
CDSA. Thus, the police may use the general arrest
powers found in s.495 of the Code to arrest for
CDSA offences.
Disjunctively read, s.495 permits arrest without
warrant under the following five circumstances:
1.
2.

3.

4.
5.

a person who has committed an indictable
offence;
a person the peace officer believes on
reasonable grounds has committed an
indictable offence;
a person the peace officer believes on
reasonable grounds is about to commit an
indictable offence;
a person the peace officer finds committing a
criminal offence; or
a person the peace officer believes on
reasonable grounds is the subject of a warrant
of arrest or committal that is in force within
the territorial jurisdiction in which the person
is found.

Has Committed an Indictable Offence
This provision is found in s. 495(1)(a) and covers a
situation where the peace officer has personal
knowledge that the person has committed an
indictable offence:
s.495(1)(a) Criminal Code
A peace officer may arrest without warrant…a person
who has committed an indictable offence…
2

See for example R. v. Bienvenue (2001) 155 C.C.C. (3d) 442 (Que. C.A.)

Volume 3 Issue 4
May/June 2003

“has committed” means the arresting officer has
personal knowledge of the offence. This may
require that the offence was committed in the
officer's presence and observed by them. In R. v.
Klimchuk (1991) 67 C.C.C (3d) 385 (B.C.C.A.),
Justice Wood of the British Columbia Court of
Appeal stated:
Looking in particular at the first part of s.495(1)(a),
a peace officer is entitled to arrest a person who
has committed an indictable offence. Before such an
arrest can be made, the peace officer must know
that the arrestee has committed an indictable
offence. In order for him to know that, he must
have witnessed the indictable offence occurring.
Correctly construed, then, this first part of the
provision covers those few situations where the
arresting officer, having personally witnessed the
commission of an indictable offence could not
prevent it or perfect an arrest before its
completion.

“indictable offence” includes both strictly
indictable offences and dual procedure offences.
s.34(1) Interpretation Act
Where an enactment creates an offence, (a) the
offence is deemed to be an indictable offence if the
enactment provides that the offender may be
prosecuted for the offence by indictment;…

Believes on Reasonable Grounds Has
Committed an Indictable Offence
This provision is also found in s. 495(1)(a) of the
Criminal Code and covers the situation where the
peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe
that an indictable offence has been committed.
s. 495(1)(a) Criminal Code
A peace officer may arrest without warrant…a person…
who, on reasonable grounds, he believes has
committed… an indictable offence…

In R. v. Biron (1976) 2 S.C.R. 56 (S.C.C.), Justice
Martland for the majority of the Supreme Court
of Canada stated:
This paragraph, limited in its application to
indictable offences, deals with the situation in
which an offence has already been committed… The

9

peace officer is not present at its commission. He
may have to rely upon information received from
others. The paragraph therefore enables him to act
on his belief, if based on [reasonable] grounds.

“reasonable grounds to believe” means the facts
within the officer's knowledge would satisfy a
reasonable person standing in the shoes of the
officer that there is reason to believe that the
person has committed an indictable offence.
The police officer does not have to have personally
witnessed an indictable offence, but must possess
reasonable grounds to believe that an indictable
offence has been committed. The reasonable
grounds for belief could be a combination of
observations, information, and experience. Even if
it turns out that the person is later acquitted of
the charge, the acquittal does not render the
arrest unlawful, as long as there were reasonable
grounds upon which the police officer acted3. Of
course, the arresting officer must be able to
articulate and explain those grounds in order to
justify the arrest.
This underscores the
importance of accurate, timely, and detailed notetaking.
“indictable offence” includes both
indictable offences and dual offences4.

strictly

Believes on Reasonable Grounds is about
to Commit an Indictable Offence
This provision, also found in s. 495(1)(a) of the
Criminal Code, applies to circumstances where a
peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe
that the person is about to commit an indictable
offence.
s.495(1)(a) Criminal Code
A peace officer may arrest without warrant (a) a
person… who, on reasonable grounds, he believes … is
about to commit an indictable offence…

police officer must have reasonable grounds for
believing that the anticipated conduct,…the
commission of an indictable offence, will likely
occur if the person is not detained"5.
This provision does not create an offence but
allows for an arrest as a preventative (nonretributive) measure. An arrest in this case
prevents the probability of the person committing
an offence which the peace officer reasonably
believes would be committed if the arrest does not
take place. For example, in R. v. Beaudette (1957)
118 C.C.C. 295 (Ont.C.A.), the court upheld the
conviction of an accused on a charge of resisting
arrest after he was arrested because he was
intoxicated and the police believed he was
intending to drive a motor vehicle when he was
observed leaving a liquor establishment..
However, since the person has not committed an
offence, the person must be unconditionally
released as soon as practicable after either the
peace officer or the officer in charge is satisfied
that the continued detention of that person in
custody is no longer necessary in order to prevent
the commission of the indictable offence. This
release is required pursuant to the provisions of
s.503(4) of the Criminal Code.
s. 503(4) Criminal Code
A peace officer or an officer in charge having the
custody of a person who has been arrested without
warrant as a person about to commit an indictable
offence shall release that person unconditionally as
soon as practicable after he is satisfied that the
continued detention of that person in custody is no
longer necessary in order to prevent the commission
by him of an indictable offence.

This section provides the power to arrest someone
for an apprehended or probable future indictable
offence. To properly invoke this authority, "the

This preventative arrest provision may be useful,
particularly in volatile circumstances such as
domestic situations or bar disturbances where,
upon police attendance, no criminal offence has yet
taken place. In many of these situations, an
aggressive party may be under the influence of
alcohol and agitated, and leaving them in the

3

5

4

See R. v. McKibbon (1973) 12 C.C.C. (2d) 66 (B.C.C.A.)
see s.34(1) Criminal Code

Volume 3 Issue 4
May/June 2003

Brown v. Durham (Regional Municipality) Police Force (1998) 43 O.R. (3d) 223
(Ont.C.A.) appeal to S.C.C. granted [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 87

10

circumstance would almost certainly result in an
assault. If alternative measures do not diffuse
the situation, this provision provides the police
with the authority to take a preventative measure
in arresting and removing the aggressor, provided
the requisite grounds for belief exist.
However, if there are reasonable grounds to
believe that an indictable offence has been
committed (e.g. a threatening or an assault), then
the person may be arrested for that substantive
offence. By arresting for the substantive offence,
the person may be detained by the police where
pre-trial conditions of release may be imposed,
such as no contact orders, non attendance orders,
or alcohol prohibitions. It must be remembered
that a person arrested only on the preventative
authority as a person about to commit an indictable
offence must be released unconditionally, and
therefore no conditions of release may be
imposed6.
“indictable offence” includes both
indictable offences and dual offences7.

strictly

Finds Committing a Criminal Offence
This provision is found in s. 495(1)(b) of the
Criminal Code and applies to circumstances where a
peace officer finds a person committing a criminal
offence.
s. 495(1)(b) Criminal Code
A peace officer may arrest without a warrant…(b) a
person whom he finds committing a criminal offence,

"finds committing" has been both strictly and
liberally interpreted by the courts. Strictly
speaking, in R. v. Biron, Justice Martland stated:
Paragraph (b) applies in relation to any criminal
offence and it deals with the situation in which the
peace officer himself finds an offence being
committed. His power to arrest is based upon his
own observation. Because it is based on his own
discovery of an offence actually being committed

there is no reason to refer to a belief based upon
reasonable grounds.

Furthermore, "the validity of an arrest under this
paragraph must be determined in relation to the
circumstances which were apparent to the peace
officer at the time the arrest was made"8. In the
event the person arrested is later acquitted, the
police will nonetheless be protected from liability
of false arrest, assault etc., as long as the officer
had reasonable grounds to believe that the person
was apparently committing a criminal offence at
the time of their arrest9. To do otherwise would
mean that, absent a conviction, a peace officer
could not be certain that an offence had been
committed and could not arrest in such
circumstances10. Simply stated "the power to
arrest without warrant is given where the peace
officer [themselves] finds a situation in which a
person is apparently committing an offence11". In
other words, this provision could be interpreted as
requiring reasonable grounds to believe the person
is committing a criminal offence.
In addition to the strict interpretation of "finds
committing" (actually witnessing the offence), a
liberal interpretation of "finds committing" has
been considered. In Frey v. Fedoruk, Stone and
Watt (1949) 95 C.C.C. 206 (B.C.C.A.) reversed on
other grounds (1950) 97 C.C.C. 1 (S.C.C.) the court
found that a police officer who arrives on the
scene shortly after an offence may subsequently
make an arrest under this provision provided the
arrest and the "seeing" are intimately connected.
In this case a private person arrested the accused
who was seen "peeping" in the windows of a house.
Fifteen minutes later the officer arrived and
subsequently arrested the accused without a
warrant. British Columbia Court of Appeal Justice
O'Halloran opined at p.220/221:
"[The authorities] establish that if the offender is
seen doing the act by one person, he may be
apprehended by another who did not see him doing

8
6

Unless of course, while being detained, the police lay a s.810 Criminal Code
information seeking a recognizance.
7
see s.34(1) Criminal Code

Volume 3 Issue 4
May/June 2003

R. v. Biron (1976) 2 S.C.R. 56 (S.C.C.)
See Cluett v. the Queen (1985) 21 C.C.C. (3d) 318 (S.C.C.)
See R. v. Biron (1976) 2 S.C.R. 56 (S.C.C.)
11
Ibid.
9

10

11

the act, provided the arrest occurs in fresh pursuit,
or in circumstances of a continuing nature with no
break in the connection between the "seeing" and
the arrest; it must constitute a continuance of the
same transaction"

In R. v. Pithpart (1987) 34 C.C.C. (3d) 150
(B.C.Co.Crt), the accused was arrested by way of a
police undercover team operation. A plain-clothes
officer made the initial contact with the accused,
who offered her services as a prostitute to the
plain clothes officer. The plain-clothes officer
gave a pre-arranged signal to two officers in
uniform who then made the arrest and took the
accused down to police headquarters where she
was detained in custody overnight. In holding that
the arresting officers found the prostitute
committing the offence of soliciting, the Court
found the commission of the offence and the
arrest to have been part of a single transaction12.
In Everywoman's Health Centre Society (1988)
Victoria Drive Medical Clinic Ltd. v. Brydges [1989]
B.C.J. No. C886265 (B.C.S.C.), the Court reviewed
the phrase "found violating" as it appeared in the
terms of a court order. The order authorized the
police to arrest "any persons found violating" its
provisions. At issue was whether the phrase “found
violating” empowered the police to arrest persons
who were violating the order immediately prior to
police arrival, but were not in violation at the
moment of arrival. In this case, persons would
block the entrance door to the centre in
contravention of the court order, but at the time
police arrived would no longer be blocking the door.
British Columbia Supreme Court Justice Cohen, in
citing Frey, stated:
In my opinion, the words: "any person found violating
any provision of paragraph (a) or (e) must, by law, be
given their practical, sensible meaning as including
violating conduct which takes place just before the
police arrive at the scene. Of course, the police
must, as is their normal practice, make reasonable
enquiries to find reasonable and probable grounds to
conclude that any person has recently violated the
12
In the alternative, the Court held the arresting officer was the agent of the plainclothes officer and therefore in law, the arrest was made by the plain-clothes officer.

Volume 3 Issue 4
May/June 2003

Order. If the police so find, then [the court order]
justifies and requires the police to make an arrest.
[emphasis added]

“criminal offence” means any federal statute
offence, including indictable, dual and summary
conviction.
This provision is the only peace officer warrantless
power of arrest (outside s. 494(1)(b) of the
Criminal Code), which covers summary conviction
offences. However, because there is no power of
arrest for strictly summary conviction offences,
unless they are found committing, the offender
could still be charged with a summary offence.
The officer must simply compel the person's court
attendance through another method such as
requesting a summons or the issuance of a warrant.

Believes on Reasonable Grounds is the
Subject of a Warrant
Section. 495(1)(c) of the Criminal Code gives a
peace officer the power to arrest anyone the
peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe
there is a warrant (of arrest or committal) in Part
XXVIII of the Criminal Code in force in the
jurisdiction in which the person is found.
An
arrest under this section is authorized if there are
reasonable grounds for believing a warrant is in
force13.
s. 495(1)(c) Criminal Code
A peace officer may arrest without warrant…(c) a
person in respect of whom he has reasonable grounds
to believe that a warrant of arrest or committal, in
any form set out in Part XXVIII in relation thereto,
is in force within the territorial jurisdiction in which
the person is found.

“reasonable grounds to believe” in the context
of this provision means that the peace officer
does not have to rely on the actual warrant being
in hand as the authority for the arrest, but can
rely on reliable information (such as CPIC
information, or information received from another
police officer or the court) that the warrant
13

R. v. Dennis 2001 B.C.S.C. 615 at para 17.

12

exists. Although this arrest authority is
warrantless, it is nonetheless predicated on a
reasonably held belief that a warrant does exist. A
warrant exists as soon as the judge makes it, even
before the order is committed to writing14.
“warrant” (arrest or committal) is a judicial order
directed to peace officers to arrest a person and
bring them before the court. The warrant will
have a specific radius of coverage (i.e. it will be in
force only within a specified territorial
jurisdiction—e.g. British Columbia radius, or
Canada-wide, depending on the charge). Arrest or
committal warrants should not be confused with
search or entry warrants, or warrants issued under
other federal or provincial statutes.
“in force in the jurisdiction in which the person
is found” means that the warrant must cover the
territorial jurisdiction in which the person is
arrested. This territorial or geographical area that
an arrest warrant is executable will be dependent
upon the provision that authorizes the issuance of
the warrant. For example, a bench warrant issued
for non-attendance at trial where an indictment
has been preferred against an accused is
executable anywhere in Canada (see s.597 Criminal
Code). Other warrants only carry with it the
territorial jurisdiction of the justice, judge, or
court that issues the warrant (see s.513 Criminal
Code).
However, the territorial radius of a warrant may
be limited for public policy, practical, and
administrative reasons by the Crown or police
agency. This is known as labeling15. The Crown and
police set returnable radii for such reasons as the
cost of physically returning the subject of a
warrant to the jurisdiction for trial. This decision
is often based on the seriousness of the offence.
For practical purposes, police officers should
respect the warrant radius stated in the CPIC
entry. For example, if the suspect is found in
Vancouver and the warrant has a British Columbia

radius, then that person can be arrested; however,
if the warrant has a “Manitoba only” radius, then
that person should not be arrested on the warrant
in Vancouver or anywhere else in British Columbia.
A police officer should always confirm with CPIC
or the communications operator to determine the
radius of the warrant before making the arrest.
Furthermore, the warrant should be confirmed
with the originating agency. In the event the
subject of an arrest warrant is located outside the
specified radius of the CPIC entry, a request can
be made to the originating agency requesting an
extension on the radius of the warrant. If the
request is granted, follow up investigation can be
made and the person subject to arrest at a later
time.
Although warrants may be “Canada Wide” because
the Criminal Code permits judges elsewhere to
“validate” or back warrants from other
jurisdictions16, Crown Counsel retains the
discretion to extend or reduce the radius of a
warrant to meet the individual needs of a case.

Protection from liability
Provided a police officer acts in good faith, they
will be protected from liability in the event that
the warrant later turns out be defective:
s.25(2) Criminal Code
Where a person is required or authorized to execute a
process…that person or any person who assists him is, if
that person acts in good faith, justified in executing the
process…notwithstanding that the process…is defective
or that it was issued or imposed without jurisdiction or
in excess of jurisdiction.

Furthermore, if an officer makes an arrest
pursuant to a warrant, but in fact arrests the
wrong person, they will be protected from criminal
liability if they were acting on reasonable grounds
and in good faith that they had the right person:
s.28(1) Criminal Code
Where a person who is authorized to execute a
warrant to arrest believes, in good faith and on

14

See R. v. Gunn (1997) 113 C.C.C. (3d) 174 (Alta.C.A.) application for leave to
appeal dismissed [1997] S.C.C.A. No. 175 (S.C.C.).
R. v Cardinal (1985) 21 C.C.C. (3d) 259 (Alta. C.A)

15

Volume 3 Issue 4
May/June 2003

16

R. Cardinal (1985) 21 C.C.C. (3d) 254 (Alta. C.A.)

13

reasonable grounds, that the person whom he arrests is
the person named in the warrant, he is protected from
criminal responsibility in respect thereof to the same
extent as if that person were the person named in the
warrant.

Duty to possess warrant
Section 29(1) of the Criminal Code requires the
police officer to have the warrant in possession, if
feasible, and to produce the warrant if requested
by the person.
s. 29(1) Criminal Code
It is the duty of every one who executes a process or
warrant to have it with him, where it is feasible to do
so, and to produce it when requested to do so.

However, in many cases it will not be feasible,
since the warrants are held on file within the
police agency responsible for the investigation
that led to the issuance of the warrant. For
example, a routine CPIC query of a driver of a
motor vehicle may indicate there is an
outstanding warrant for their arrest. The law
does not require that the officer first obtain a
copy of the warrant prior to executing it on the
roadside. However, if the officer is executing a
specific warrant and has the warrant in their
possession at the time of service, the officer
must produce the warrant when requested.

LIMITATIONS ON ARREST
Once a police officer has determined that the
power of arrest under s.495(1) of the Criminal
Code for an offence exists, a duty is imposed on
the officer under s. 495(2) not to arrest in
prescribed circumstances. Therefore, even if the
officer has the power of arrest under s. 495(1) of
the Code, the officer will not necessarily exercise
that power. These limits recognize the need to
prevent unnecessary pre-trial detention and the
availability of less expensive and less onerous ways
to compel an individual's appearance in court. This
provision also establishes criteria, commonly
referred to as “public interest” and “court
appearance”, which must be considered in deciding
whether to carry out the arrest.

Volume 3 Issue 4
May/June 2003

s.495(2) Criminal Code
A peace officer shall not arrest a person without
warrant for
(a) an indictable offence mentioned in section 553,
(b) an offence for which the person may be
prosecuted by indictment or for which he is
punishable on summary conviction, or
(c) an offence punishable on summary conviction,
in any case where
(d) he believes on reasonable grounds that the public
interest, having regard to all the circumstances
including the need to
(i) establish the identity of the person,
(ii) secure or preserve evidence of or relating to
the offence, or
(iii) prevent the continuation or repetition of the
offence or the commission of another
offence, may be satisfied without so arresting
the person, and
(e) he has no reasonable grounds to believe that, if
he does not so arrest the person, the person will
fail to attend court in order to be dealt with
according to law.

Shall Not Arrest
“Shall not arrest” means that the peace officer
must consider the limitations on arrest found in
s.495(2) of the Criminal Code prior to arresting a
person, and then refrain from arresting the person
if an arrest is unnecessary having regard to the
established criteria (i.e. public interest and court
appearance). However, in many situations, the
police officer will have to take physical custody of
a person immediately upon arriving at a scene
where the offender is still present. Justification
may include a necessity to gain control of an
arrestee and establish a safe environment in which
to conduct the investigation in determining
whether public interest or court appearance is
satisfied. This will particularly be the case where
the offence involved violence or where there is a
perceived risk of the person fleeing the scene.
In the event that the police officer makes an
arrest at the scene for an offence to which
s.495(2) applies, the officer must continually
consider releasing the person if public interest is
subsequently satisfied. Under subsections 497(1)

14

and (1.1) of the Criminal Code a police officer shall
consider release when they arrest a person
without a warrant for an indictable offence
mentioned in s.553 (offences that are within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the provincial court), a
dual offence, or a summary conviction offence. In
other words, if a police officer arrests a person
under s.495(1) of the Code, s.497 requires the
officer to consider releasing the person if the
public interest and court appearance criteria are
satisfied; if these criteria are met, the officer
shall not continue the arrest and release the
person.
s.497 Criminal Code
(1) Subject to subsection (1.1), if a peace officer
arrests a person without warrant for an offence
described in paragraph 496(a), (b) or (c), the peace
officer shall, as soon as practicable,
(a) release the person from custody with the
intention of compelling their appearance by way of
summons; or
(b) issue an appearance notice to the person and then
release them.
(1.1) A peace officer shall not release a person under
subsection (1) if the peace officer believes, on
reasonable grounds,
(a) that it is necessary in the public interest that the
person be detained in custody or that the matter of
their release from custody be dealt with under
another provision of this Part, having regard to all the
circumstances including the need to
(i) establish the identity of the person,
(ii) secure or preserve evidence of or relating to the
offence,
(iii) prevent the continuation or repetition of the
offence
or
the
commission
of
another
offence, or
(iv) ensure the safety and security of any victim of or
witness to the offence; or
(b) that if the person is released from custody, the
person will fail to attend court in order to be dealt
with according to law.

The public interest provisions included in s.497 of
the Code have been expanded upon by the addition
of a fourth element; ensuring "the safety and
security of any victim of or witness to the
offence".

Volume 3 Issue 4
May/June 2003

PUBLIC INTEREST
No narrow definition of "public interest" has been
developed in law. In order to determine whether
the "public interest" would be satisfied by arrest
or release, the peace officer must consider all the
circumstances of the offence including, but not
limited to17, those conditions referred to in
s.495(2)(d) of the Criminal Code.
s.495(2)(d) C.C.C.
A peace officer shall not arrest…in any case where
(d) he believes on reasonable grounds that the public
interest, having regard to all the circumstances
including the need to
(i)
establish the identity of the person,
(ii)
secure or preserve evidence of or relating to
the offence, or
(iii)
prevent the continuation or repetition of the
offence or the commission of another offence
may be satisfied without so arresting the person

Need to establish identity
Police may arrest if it is necessary to establish
identity18. The police officer must be satisfied
that the suspect’s identity has been established,
so that if an arrest is not perfected the person's
attendance in court can be secured by a secondary
method such as an appearance notice or summons.
This is necessary to ensure that:
•
•

the charge will be laid against the correct
individual; and
if the person fails to appear for court, a
warrant for arrest may be issued.

Moreover, "establishing
identity includes the
steps necessary to identify in the future the
person answering the charge in the court-room as
the person" detained or arrested by the police at
the time of the offence19. This may require the
police
officer
verifying
identity
through
photographic identification (ie. drivers license,
passport, etc.), querying the individual on CPIC to
17

see R. v. Sieben (1989) 51 C.C.C. (3d) 343 (Alta.C.A.), Collins v. Brantford Police
Services Board (2001) Docket: C34623 Ont. C.A.
See R. v. Lavin (1992) 76 C.C.C. (3d) 279 per Tyndale J.A. at p.282.
19
R. v. Dilling (1993) 84 C.C.C. (3d) 325 (B.C.C.A.) leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused 88
C.C.C. (3d) vi (S.C.C.)
18

15

obtain previous criminal record20 and description,
further investigation to determine other details of
the individual such as physical characteristics (ie.
height, weight, tattoos, marks, scars, etc.), place
of residence, or other relevant matters for
purposes of identification. It may be necessary in
some cases to establish identity by fingerprinting
the individual21.

Need to secure or preserve evidence of or
in relation to the offence
This may require a search of the person or
surroundings to discover, secure, or preserve
evidence related to the arrest. There may be a
need to arrest the person for example, to search
incidental to the arrest22. Another example where
arrest might be required would be to prevent the
arrested person from interfering with the
execution
of
a
search
warrant
or
a
contemporaneous investigation that may require
the discovery or preservation of evidence at a
secondary location. An arrest may prevent the
person from warning other persons yet to be
arrested who may interfere with the investigation.

Need to prevent the continuation or
repetition of the offence or the commission
of other offences
An arrest may be required, for example, when the
police officer finds a person committing an assault.
Following intervention, if the police officer
believes that the assault will be repeated if an
arrest is not effected, an arrest is justified. In R.
v. Venzi [1997] B.C.J. No 3019 (B.C.S.C.), Justice
Lamperson reviewed the application of s.495(2) of
the Code with respect to an arrest for an assault
which occurred in a domestic context. The Court
found that "section 495(2) requires among other
things that for a police officer not to arrest
pursuant to s.495(1), [they] must have reasonable

20

A person should have an intimate knowledge of their criminal history and
therefore questioning them in regards to their record may assist in confirming
their identity.
21
See R. v. Higgins & Beare (1988) 45 C.C.C. (3d) 57 (S.C.C.).
22
See R. v. Lavin (1992) 76 C.C.C. (3d) 279 (Que. C.A.) per Tyndale J.A. at p.282.

Volume 3 Issue 4
May/June 2003

grounds to believe that an offence will not
reoccur". The Court further went on to state:
Section 495(2) mandates that a police officer, who
has [reasonable] grounds under s.495(1), must
arrest unless he has [reasonable] grounds to believe
that an arrest is not necessary for the protection
of the public. In other words, if he does not have
[reasonable] grounds to conclude that the
respondent will not commit another offence then he
must arrest.

In R. v. McIntosh (1984) 29 M.V.R. 50 (B.C.C.A.),
the British Columbia Court of Appeal examined the
arrest of an impaired driver to determine whether
it was made in compliance with the Criminal Code.
Justice Esson, for the unanimous court, held:
The burden upon the Crown was not to establish
that the accused would have driven his car. The
officer…rightly viewed the question as whether
there was a risk of that occurring or, to look at it
the other way, whether the officer could be certain
that it would not occur. It does not matter that the
risk, in statistical terms may have been small.

In R. v. Ware (1987) 49 M.V.R. 97 (B.C.Co.Crt.),
another impaired driving case, Justice Lamperson
reviewed applicable cases on public interest and
stated:
Although the following list is not exhaustive, those
cases suggest that a police officer considering an
arrest under s. 450(2) [now 495(2)] should keep the
following factors in mind:
(1) The criteria set out in s. 450(2) are not allembracing;
(2) The public interest, having regard to all the
circumstances, must be the main consideration;
(3) In impaired driving cases a possible repetition
of the offence must be the paramount concern
because of the tragic results which may follow;
(4) The officer must consider the mental and
physical condition of the suspect;
(5) In deciding whether to arrest, the officer may
draw on his own experience, the experience of
fellow officers and the collective experience of the
force;
(6) He is entitled to arrest if he cannot satisfy
himself that the suspect will not repeat the
offence.

16

In Ware, the Court also recognized that some
allowance must be given to an "on the street"
application of public interest (as opposed to an
application made in the comfort of a controlled
environment like a police office):
A court must take into account that the arrests
took place at the scene. In those circumstances it is
unrealistic to expect a police officer to apply the
criteria set out in s.450(2) [now s.495(2)] with the
same precision as he would in the relative calm of
the police station.

However, if the arrest is effected in the absence
public interest being satisfied, once public interest
is satisfied there is a requirement under s.497 of
the Criminal Code to release the person and
compel court attendance through another method.

The need to ensure the safety and security
of the victim or witness to the offence.
This element is absent from the considerations of
public interest in s. 496 of the Criminal Code
(release without arrest), however appear in ss. 497
and 498 of the Criminal Code (release following
arrest). It may be necessary to arrest a person to
secure a victim’s or witness’ welfare or because of
an apprehended threat to the safety and well
being of a victim or witness to the offence.
Conditional release with restrictions such as no
contact orders or no attendance orders may be
warranted to protect the victim or witness.

Summary of
following:
•
•
•

•

"public interest" includes the

the need to establish the identity of the
person
the need to secure or preserve evidence of or
in relation to the offence
the need to prevent the
- continuation of the offence
- repetition of the offence
- the commission of another offence
the need to ensure the safety and security of
any victim or witness to the offence

Volume 3 Issue 4
May/June 2003

Once an accused has been arrested, it is not a
requirement of the Code for a police officer to
"enumerate the reasons for the exercise of [their]
discretion in holding an individual", although it may
be preferable to advise the arrestee23.

Policy Based Arrests
A decision to arrest and detain should be based on
reasons relating specifically to the individual24. An
arrest based solely on policy (ie. the British
Columbia Attorney General's Policy on violence
against women) rather than for reasons pertaining
to the individual is unlawful and arbitrary (contrary
to s.9 of the Charter)25. It would be equally wrong
for an individual police officer or police force to
have a policy to arrest regardless of the
circumstances26. However, the question on whether
a detention will be arbitrary will not only be
whether the arrest was based on policy, but also
whether in fact s.495(2) of the Criminal Code was
breached by the arrest not being reasonable in the
public interest27.
For example, in R. v. Hardt [1999] B.C.J. 1288
(B.C.S.C.), the police arrested the accused for
assault arising from a domestic circumstance. The
accused argued that the "real reason" the arrest
was made was to achieve policy objectives (the
Attorney General's policy on spousal abuse) and
the police were therefore not acting in the lawful
execution of their duty. Justice Smith recognized
that reference to policy considerations do not in
all cases render an arrest arbitrary and may go to
the officer's state of mind when assessing the
validity of the arrest under s.495 of the Code. The
Court held:
The mere reference to "policy" does not mean that
the arrest was motivated by general policy
considerations rather than by specific reasonable
and probable grounds causing the officer to believe
the appellant had committed an indictable offence
as required under s. 495(1). Just as the police in
23

R. v. Ronnie [1999] B.C.J. No. 813 (B.C.Prov.Ct.)
R. v. Pithart (1987) 34 C.C.C. (3d) 150 (B.C.Co. Crt.)
See R. v. Venzi [1997] B.C.J. No. 3019 (B.C.S.C.), R. v. Faulkner (1988) 9 M.V.R.
(2d) 137 (B.C.C.A.)
26
See R. v. Ware (1987) 49 M.V.R. 97 (B.C.Co.Crt.)
27
R. v. Cayer (1988) 6 M.V.R. (2d) 1 (Ont.C.A.)
24
25

17

the execution of their duty must bear in mind
guidelines, for example, for the manner in which
they inform accused persons of their rights under
the Charter, they must also bear in mind guidelines
or policies for the manner in which they conduct
assessments under s. 495(1).

In a sense, the continuing obligation to assess
public interest and court appearance takes a
“ladder” approach and each rung, or stage, involves
its own assessment of the release criteria.

COURT APPEARANCE

Judge

In addition to "public interest", the peace officer
must also consider whether, if released, the
accused will appear in court.

Justice

s.495(2)(e) Criminal Code
A peace officer shall not arrest…in any case where
(e)…he has no reasonable grounds to believe that, if he
does not so arrest the person, the person will fail to
attend court in order to be dealt with according to law.

This provision places an affirmative duty on a
police officer not to arrest unless the officer
possesses the requisite grounds of belief. The
information available to the police officer will
determine whether there are reasonable grounds
to believe that the person will not appear for
court. Criteria to be considered may include:
•
•
•

•

the offender states they will not attend court;
previous convictions for failing to appear in
court;
outstanding warrants of arrest in other
jurisdictions indicating the person's propensity
to avoid the court jurisdiction; or
a person is so intoxicated that they may not
recall the police officer speaking to them or
understand the conditions of court attendance.

As with public interest, if the arresting officer is
justified in arresting to ensure court appearance
and the situation changes (e.g. the intoxicated
accused sobers and can now understand the charge
and release), there is a continuing requirement for
the arresting officer (and the officer in charge) to
re-consider releasing the person and compelling
their court attendance by another method.

Officer in Charge
Arresting Officer

PATROLS ON THE WILD SIDE:
WHERE FACTS ARE OFTEN
FUNNIER THAN FICTION
Collected By Constable Ian Barraclough…
Case of Mistaken Identity
The BBC reported at the beginning of May that a
police officer in Israel got more than he
bargained for during a routine house call. In
response to a noise complaint made by a
neighbour, a young male police constable was
dispatched to investigate. Upon arriving at the
scene, he found himself amongst a crowd of
female revellers celebrating a hen party.
Unbeknown to the constable, the women had
ordered a stripper to perform at their party and
were expecting him to arrive when the constable
knocked on the door. Furthermore, they had
specifically requested that the entertainment
company send them someone dressed as a police
officer!

The Release “Ladder”

Volume 3 Issue 4
May/June 2003

18

Suddenly finding himself the main attraction, the
young constable had to start fending off the
rowdy women who, honestly mistook the constable
as a stripper, started to undress and caress him.
One of the partygoers "took off my shirt and
untied my shoelaces," the officer was quoted as
saying by the Yedioth Ahronoth daily, "She
started stroking me and called on her friends to
join in." As a last resort, the constable pulled out
his badge, but the party goers simply thought it
was all part of the act. The police officer was
reportedly only able to extricate himself when his
partner called for back-up. The revellers were
fined. [bbc.co.uk/news 05-05-03].

Finding the Safest Place to Hide
Thirty two year old Troy C. Stephani was
suspected of impaired driving while meandering
along a road in his pick-up truck in Medford, New
York. An officer from Suffolk County Park Police
pulled the vehicle over due to his erratic driving,
but when the officer walked up to the driver’s
side of his truck, Stephani took off. A police
chase ensued with Highway Patrol vehicles and
cruisers dispatched from the County Police Fifth
Precinct. Thinking that a “big building” complex
would offer him safe refuge from the pursuing
officers, Stephani pulled straight into the
headquarters of the Suffolk County Police
Department.
"I guess he couldn't have made a worse turn,"
Sgt. Victor Webster, of the Suffolk County Park
Police, said. "But it was good for us."
Stephani not only tried to take refuge in the
complex of the police headquarters, but he pulled
into a driveway leading directly up to the
department’s K-9 section, where he was cornered.
Asked why he didn’t yield to the pursuing officers
earlier, Stephani allegedly claimed he needed time
to finish his crack cocaine. [Salon.com-AP, 04-2803].

Volume 3 Issue 4
May/June 2003

Search Appeal Makes you Sick
You have the right to remain silent, but what if
you vomit evidence before police read you your
rights? Connecticut's Supreme Court heard
arguments in April on a rather fine point in
"Miranda warning" law: whether the police can use
a drug suspect's vomit against him (or at least
use the eight bags of heroin that came up with
the vomit). Arresting officers apparently asked
suspect Vincent Betances if he had just swallowed
heroin, and Betances (without a warning) said that
he had, leading officers to summon medical help.
Betance now says the officers' question was
unconstitutional "interrogation," even though
without immediate treatment, he could have died.
The state Supreme Court is expected to issue a
ruling this summer. [Hartford Courant, 04-23-03,
Associated Press, 04-25-03].

From Police Blotters
(Washington Post, April 11) "Mount Olivet
Road NE, 1200 block, March 30. An animal
control officer responding to a call about a
snake in a bathroom reported that the snake
was actually a hair band."
Vancouver, Washington) Columbian, Jan. 7) "A
Vancouver police officer was sent to a home
in the 3100 block of S Street ... when a
woman called 911 to say a group of 30
cannibals from Yacolt were trying to break
into her house. (Officers were unable to
locate any cannibals."
(Grass Valley (Calif.) Union, March 30) "A
Dorsey Drive convalescent facility reported
that one Alzheimer's patient struck another
Alzheimer's patient, but neither of them
remembered the incident or wanted medical
attention."
[Chuck Shepherd's News of the Weird, Week of
May 18, 2003, newsoftheweird.com].

19

ODOUR OF ALCOHOL ON
BREATH SUFFICIENT TO
JUSTIFY ROADSIDE DEMAND
R. v. Butchko, 2003 SKPC 76
The police stopped a vehicle with
three occupants after it was
observed
leave
a
liquor
establishment, make a u-turn,
accelerate, and fishtail. An odour of alcohol was
detected coming from the vehicle. The driver was
asked to step out of the vehicle and an officer
detected a strong smell of alcohol on his breath.
When asked if he had anything to drink the
driver replied that he had not. The driver was
read the roadside screening demand, but refused
to provide a sample. After repeated unsuccessful
attempts at gaining compliance to the demand,
the
officer
charged
the
defiant
and
uncooperative accused with refusal.
At his trial in Saskatchewan Provincial Court on
the charge of refusing to provide an approved
screening device sample, the accused submitted
that the smell of alcohol on his breath, by itself,
was insufficient in providing a reasonable
suspicion that he had alcohol in his body and that
the officer required additional objective indicia
of consumption. The accused filed expert
evidence that the smell of alcohol detected on a
person’s breath may not be indicative of alcohol in
the body as the ethanol may have been
eliminated, while the chemical causing the odour
has not.
Section 254(2) of the Criminal Code allows a
police officer to make a roadside demand if they
reasonably suspect the driver has alcohol in their
body. The legal threshold, reasonable suspicion, is
low and does not require a belief that a crime has
been committed. In concluding that the odour was
sufficient to provide the necessary level of
suspicion, Justice Whelan stated:

Officer’s suspicion was reasonable. I don’t believe
that it requires that the Officer’s evidence be
scrutinized in light of all the evidence before the
Court. It’s sufficient to ask; whether a reasonable
person, standing in the officer’s shoes, with the
officer’s knowledge, would have had a reasonable
suspicion.

The accused was convicted for the refusal.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org

ARRANGING SERVICES
AMOUNTS TO PROSTITUTION
R. v. Petts, 2003 NBQB 102
The
accused
stopped
an
undercover police officer on a
public street and offered to
arrange for a woman to perform
a sexual act on the officer in exchange for $40.
The accused provided the officer with an address
and telephone number. Later a woman came out of
the residence at the address provided and spoke
to the officer. The accused was charged and
convicted in New Brunswick Provincial Court of
communicating with another person to obtain the
sexual services of a prostitute. However, he
appealed to the New Brunswick Court of Queen’s
Bench arguing he was communicating not to
“obtain” sexual services, but to “provide” them. In
dismissing the appeal, Queen’s Bench Justice
McLellan concluded the accused was “acting as an
intermediary or broker between a prostitute and
a potential customer”. The Court further stated:
Here the accused stopped the undercover officer
in a public place for the purpose of communicating
with that officer that the accused could obtain
the sexual services of a prostitute for that
officer. I think the offence is established if an
accused in such circumstances attempts to arrange
the services of a prostitute for himself or for
another person.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org

I accept that the Officer genuinely possessed the
suspicion and believed it to be reasonable. An
objective scrutiny requires that I find the

Volume 3 Issue 4
May/June 2003

20

ENTRY TO PROTECT PROPERTY
LOGICAL, LAUDABLE & LAWFUL
R. v. Sanderson,
(2003) Docket:C37434 (OntCA)
The police met with a distraught
young woman after receiving a
911 call from her in the middle of
the night. She reported that her
boyfriend (the accused), at whose house she had
been living, assaulted her and made threats
concerning her dog and personal property. She
was adamant about returning to the accused’s
home and retrieving her personal belongings
(clothes, cosmetics, furniture). Four police
officers (including two trainees) went with her to
the accused’s house. She let herself and the
police in with a key. The accused was found inside
standing in the bedroom doorway and was told by
officers that they were there to keep the peace
while the woman gathered her belongings and
would then leave.
He was also told they were there to investigate
the allegations she made and that he could come
with them voluntarily for questioning to the police
station or otherwise they would seek an arrest
warrant for the assault. The accused told the
police to get a warrant, swore at them, and
ordered them from the home. The woman wanted
to retrieve some items from the bedroom, but
the accused refused to move out of the doorway
and continued to block entry despite several
requests by the police to move. He was arrested
for obstruction after being warned. He resisted
arrest and a struggle ensued. Pepper spray was
deployed and the accused was subsequently
subdued.
At trial the accused was convicted of the earlier
offences respecting the altercation between
himself and his girlfriend, but was acquitted of
the obstruct and resist charges. In the trial
judge’s view, once the police decided they would
not arrest the accused at that time for the
earlier altercation, the police “ought to have left

Volume 3 Issue 4
May/June 2003

the residence…and pursued alternate remedies to
protect the property of the alleged victim”. A
Crown appeal to the Ontario Superior Court of
Justice was dismissed. The appeal court judge
found that the police “should have exercised
better judgment in this matter, there being no
ongoing or continuing exigent circumstances
following their unlawful entry.” The Crown
appealed again, this time to the Ontario Court of
Appeal.

The Entry
The Crown argued that the police were lawfully
entitled to enter the accused’s residence
because:
1) the girlfriend, as occupier, had invited them
in to assist her, and
2) they were discharging their common law duty
to preserve the peace and protect property.
The accused submitted that the girlfriend was
only a guest, not an occupant, and therefore did
not have the authority to give consent to the
entry. Although the Ontario Court of Appeal did
not interfere with the trial judge’s finding that
the girlfriend could not give the police permission
to enter, both the common law and statutory
duties imposed on the police to preserve the
peace and protect property were engaged. In
evaluating the common law powers and duties of
the police, a two-stage enquiry (derived from the
English case R. v. Waterfield, [1963] 3 All E.R.
659 (C.C.A.)) was used:
1) Did the police conduct fall within the general
scope of any duty imposed by statute or
recognized at common law? and
2) Did the police conduct involve an unjustifiable
use of powers associated with the general
scope of that duty?
In holding that the police entry was justified
using the Waterfield test, Justice MacPherson,
for the unanimous court, wrote:

21

The powers and duties of a peace officer emanate
from common law and statute. The general duty of
a peace officer is to preserve peace as it relates
to the protection of life and property.

And further:
The officer’s were faced with a distraught woman
in the middle of the night. She, and an independent
witness, reported that she had been assaulted by
the [accused]. She had left the residence in only
her pyjamas and without footwear-on March 29.
The altercation continued, and another assault
took place, when the complainant returned to the
house with [a friend] to retrieve her dog and
personal belongings. After she left a second time,
the [accused] followed her to [the friend’s]
apartment where, in a heated exchange, he
threatened to burn her personal belongings.
Hearing all of this when they arrived, the police
were fully justified, in my view, in deciding to go to
the [accused’s] house and, accompanied by the
complainant who told them that she lived there and
had a key, to enter it. They were investigating
several potential criminal offences and they had
reason to believe that the [accused] would destroy
the complainant’s personal property. Moreover,
they wanted to assist the complainant with
retrieving her clothing and personal belongings, and
getting away from the [accused], so that she could
proceed to her parents’ home…

Justice MacPherson concluded the officer’s
decision to go with the girlfriend to the accused’s
residence was logical and laudable—“precisely
what a distraught citizen would want and need
from a police officer.”

Police conduct inside residence
Both lower court judgments concluded that the
continued police presence once asked to leave, as
well as the order to move from the doorway, was
unlawful. Since the accused did not appear to be
imminently endangering the property—he was not
in the process of destroying it—other avenues to
protect the property should have been pursued.
The Ontario Court of Appeal disagreed. Justice
MacPherson stated:

Volume 3 Issue 4
May/June 2003

The steps the police took inside the dwelling were
directed to [prevent her belongings from being
burned and to assist her in removing them from
the dwelling]. If the [accused] had moved out of
the bedroom doorway, the complainant, under the
watchful eye of the police, could have safely
removed her belongings (one purpose fulfilled)
which in turn would have given the respondent no
opportunity to burn them (the second purpose
fulfilled). The police were fulfilling their common
law and statutory duties of protecting property
and assisting a victim of crime. The first stage of
the Waterfield analysis has been met.

In assessing the second stage of Waterfield,
whether the conduct of the police involved a
unjustifiable use of police powers associated with
the duty of preserving the peace and protecting
property, the Court held:
…The police had been called to assist a distraught
young woman in the middle of the night who, after
being assaulted twice, had been forced to flee her
boyfriend's residence, without any shoes, and
wearing only her pyjamas.
There have been significant and commendable
changes in recent years in the response of
Canadian police to domestic violence situations.
There is now a much greater recognition by the
police of both the extent and the seriousness of
the problem, and the consequences for victims in
the community, when the police fail to respond.
Police officers are often the first persons called
to respond in situations of domestic violence. In my
view, it is very much in the public interest that the
police, in the discharge of their public duties, be
willing and able to assist victims of domestic
violence with leaving their relationships and their
residences safely and with their belongings. That
is precisely what the police did in the present case.
The actions of the police in the [accused’s]
residence were geared to a justifiable use of their
powers. Constable Paul explained to the [accused]
that they would leave as soon as the complainant
had retrieved her belongings. The complainant
wished to enter the bedroom, which she used when
she stayed at the [accused’s] residence, in order
to get her clothes. When the [accused] refused to
allow the complainant to enter the bedroom, the
police were justified in ordering the [accused] to

22

move, and in arresting him for obstruction when he
refused to comply.

The Court also rejected the accused’s submission
that the police should have followed a different
course of action:
I disagree with these suggestions about proper
police behaviour in the context of a volatile
domestic dispute. The suggestion that the police
might have advised the complainant to do nothing
until the morning ignores the facts that she had
been assaulted to an extent that the police noticed
a scratch mark under her eyes, that it was the
middle of the night and she had only pyjamas, and
that an angry boyfriend had just attacked her dog
and threatened to burn all of her belongings. A
suggestion by the police that neither they nor the
complainant do anything until the morning would
have been unhelpful and inappropriate.

The officer’s actions were “logical, laudable and
lawful.” The appeal was allowed, the acquittals on
the obstruction and resist charges were quashed,
and verdicts of guilty were entered. The matter
was remitted back to the trial judge to impose
sentence.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca

JUDGE ORDERS RETURN OF
SEIZED DRUG PROPERTY
Carlisle v. HMTQ, 2003 BCSC 632
The
police
searched
the
applicant’s home by consent and
found 51 marihuana plants, four
high-pressure lights, a wooden
pipe, and a container with a
green substance. He was charged with possession
for the purpose of trafficking and cultivation of
marihuana. These charges were subsequently
stayed after the applicant received an exemption
under the Marihuana Medical Access Regulations
(MMAR). He brought an application before the
Supreme Court of British Columbia seeking a
restitution order for the marihuana plants, dried
marihuana, and equipment seized, as well as

Volume 3 Issue 4
May/June 2003

$10,000 in direct and indirect monetary
restitution. He submitted that because the police
seized his marihuana and equipment he was unable
to grow his own and was therefore forced to buy
it for as much as $200 a day from other sources.
Justice Loo of the British Columbia Supreme
Court noted that since the charges had been
stayed, no forfeiture order had been made. She
ordered the items seized from him be returned.
However, the application for the monetary relief
was adjourned for 60 days until the federal
government has addressed the constitutional
issues surrounding the MMAR.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca

FINDING FUN IN FITNESS
Cst. Kelly Keith
Get your head in the game
Have you ever been running
or cycling and you've talked
yourself into feeling tired.
In any sport (especially
endurance) your mind can be
your biggest asset or your
worst enemy. How you think and what you think
about can and will affect the way you feel during
your exercise. What you think about can make
the difference between winning or losing /
enjoying or hating your training and have a big
impact on your decision to stay with an exercise
program. Become aware of what you are thinking
about in your next event.

What should you be thinking about?????
Are you using Association Techniques (focusing on
body sensations and monitoring any changes) or
Dissociation Techniques (directing attention away
from bodily sensations by a form of distraction)?
So which is best?
•

Association may be linked to faster running
times

23

•

Dissociation can reduce the sense of effort
and awareness of physical sensations such as
pain and fatigue - usually moderate to high
intensity

Techniques for Dissociation:
•

Music - this can generate positive thoughts,
improve your mood state and distract you
from the physical demands of your sport;

•

Athletes of all levels appear to favour
association in competition and dissociation in
training

•

•

Elite athletes tend to use both strategies
during endurance training and races and are
able to switch between the two as required.

Counting Game - Count the number of blue
cars you see, or the number of dogs, post
boxes etc....be inventive...;

•

Alphabet Game - Work through A to Z for a
chosen category - (names, countries etc);

•

Active Fantasy - Imagine yourself as a
lottery winner and decide how to spend your
winnings

You will need to decide which strategy is best for
you in your personal situation, preferences, and
goals.
For example Dissociation may benefit
people who want to improve their endurance by
running or exercising for longer periods of time
at moderate intensities.
Association may benefit an athlete who is trying
to set an ideal pace for optimal performance.
Association is also important in competition if you
are able to monitor bodily responses to enable you
to ride the thin line between pushing for
maximum performance and overdoing it.
In
Association you enter a concentrated state where
you can react to changes within your body. I
believe it is best to combine Associative and
Dissociate thinking for longer runs, bike rides,
etc.
I enjoy listening to music while exercising. The
music I listen to bring positive emotions to me.
However, last week I was riding up Mount
Seymour and I felt sluggish so I turned to
Dissociation techniques and starting singing (I
had walkman on), but don't worry, I had my
helmet and sunglasses on so no one knew me.
Anyways, I couldn't beat the feeling so I went
into Associative thinking and then realized that I
was in 4th gear, which is why it was so hard! The
moral of the story - Don't be too quick to go into
Dissociation thinking!!!

Volume 3 Issue 4
May/June 2003

Avoid thoughts relating to work or jobs you have
to do and anything problematic as this can
increase tension. Try to be creative and have fun
with Dissociation. It can help you relax and enjoy
your sport even more.

Techniques for Association:
•

Focus
on
your
breathing—controlled,
relatively deep rhythmic breathing is the key
to relaxation. When you breathe out, try to
imagine the tension leaving your body;

•

Try to remain relaxed while running, cycling,
swimming etc., but be aware of tension and
fatigue in your muscles. It's often a good
idea to start from the head and work down,
giving each area or group of muscles your
attention. If you notice tension, try to focus
on a cue word, such as "relax" or "easy" and
try to let tension flow out of the muscles;

•

Keep your pace in line with the information
you gain from monitoring your body. You
might, for example, increase the pace if you
feel very positive.

Repeat
the
monitoring
constantly,
or
alternatively, take some time out for Dissociation.
You might also reinforce your mood by telling
yourself how well you are doing and that you need
to keep working hard and remain focused.

24

Don't leave your psychological preparation to
chance.
Remember that you control your
thoughts, not the other way around. The way you
think is strongly linked to the way you perform.
So if you want to perform better, gain greater
control and enjoy your sport more, start planning
today!
(reference - Peak Performance News Letter)

Summers Here - Stay Hydrated !
Staying hydrated is critical for optimal workouts. The benefits of staying hydrated are
endless. I will not bore you with them - however,
whether you exercise or not staying hydrated is
imperative to GOOD HEALTH.
•

Drink 2 glasses of water first thing in the
morning

•

Drink during exercise

•

Attempt to drink 10 glasses of water every
day

•

If you drink caffeinated/alcoholic drinks drink one glass of water for every
caffeinated/alcoholic drink, and these do not
count for your regular 10 glasses

•

If you’re thirsty - you are partially
dehydrated - don't allow yourself to get this
way.

Running Uphill/Downhill
Running uphill and downhill are different in how
they affect and condition the body. They both
offer some great training benefits, not to
mention it is good to change up the intensity of
your runs, your route, and add in hills.
Downhill running will strengthen the muscles,
improve your running economy and help develop
speed, however the pounding your knee's and
body take is also increased. To avoid injury on
running downhill, try to choose gradual slopes,
and/or grass, and use short, quick strides to

Volume 3 Issue 4
May/June 2003

minimize landing
soreness.

shock

and

prevent

muscle

Uphill running is a great way to increase your
cardio. This can be a good way to get a very
intense work-out in as little time as possible. If
you want to maximize your training and it's time
to do a hill run, try this; running up 10 % of the
hill - back down to the bottom, run up 20 % of the
hill and back down - I'm sure you get the picture this is intense and not for the beginner !

What is the best way to get past a fitness
plateau?
Change your work-out. Variety is, in my opinion,
the number "1” way to blast past a training
plateau and keep you interested. This applies to
all fitness, not just weightlifting. If you usually
run on the street - take a trail run once a week.
If you’re usually a long distance cyclist, try
putting wind sprints into your routine, or if you’re
used to working certain body parts together,
change them all up. Take a look around and
change work out plans with someone. Change
everything up for six weeks and then go back to
your regular routine for bit and see how you will
improve. You'll not only break your plateaus but
you'll have increased interest !!!!!
Cst. Kelly Keith is a 15-year police veteran. He
served with the Winnipeg Police Service for 12
years before moving to Victoria where he has
been since.

ROADSIDE SCREENING DEVICE
DELAY TRIGGERS RIGHT TO
COUNSEL
R. v. Ritchie, 2003 SKQB 246
At 2:30 am the police stopped
the accused for turning right
onto a highway from the wrong
driving lane and for slowing down
at an intersection even though there was a green
light. At 2:35 am the accused was read the

25

approved screening device demand. However, the
police officer did not have a device with him and
had to wait 10 minutes for one to be brought to
the scene. The accused refused to provide a
sample and he was charged with refusal. He was
convicted at trial by the Saskatchewan Provincial
Court but appealed to the Saskatchewan Court of
Queen’s bench arguing that the demand was not
proper and that he was denied his right to counsel
under s.10(b) of the Charter when the police
failed to inform him of his right to a lawyer
before the roadside screening device arrived.
Court of Queen’s Bench Justice MacDonald
allowed the appeal and overturned the conviction.
In the Court’s view the accused was detained
when the officer assumed control over his
movement by a direction or demand, which may
have significant legal consequences and which
prevented or impeded access to counsel. In this
case, there was a delay between the making of
the demand and the arrival of the device. The
delay did not arise from exigencies, but from the
unavailability of the roadside device.
Section 254(2) of the Criminal Code requires that
the sample be taken forthwith. Thus the delay in
administering the test triggered the duty to
inform the accused of his right to counsel.
Justice MacDonald stated:
While it is generally necessary, in order to ensure
an accurate gauge of intoxication, to conduct a
screening test as soon as possible after stopping
the driver, there was in this situation, no urgency
in the sense that the officers were able to inform
the [accused] of his right to counsel when it
became apparent that there would be a delay in
administering the test. The officers had ample
opportunity in the intervening minutes between the
detention and the time that the screening device
arrived to either inform the [accused] of his right
to counsel, without any hardship being imposed
upon them in doing so or to take the [accused] to
the police station which was only two blocks away
and administer the Borkenstein breathalyzer to
him.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org

Volume 3 Issue 4
May/June 2003

CLASS 91 GRADUATES
The Police Academy is pleased to
announce the successful graduation
of recruit Class 91 as qualified
municipal constables on June 6,
2003.
DELTA
Cst. Robert Anzulovich
Cst. Shaun Begg
Cst. Ryan Jeffrey

NEW WESTMINSTER
Cst. Wendy Bowyer
Cst. Nicholas Ferguson

SAANICH
Cst. William Dodds
Cst. Leanne Montgomery
Cst. Martin Steen

VANCOUVER
Cst. Rodney Buysse
Cst. Peter Froh
Cst. Burinder Gill
Cst. Lene Jensen
Cst. Jason Lawrence
Cst. David Marsh
Cst. Barbara Martens
Cst. Colin McLachlen
Cst. Ryan Perry
Cst. Robert Phoenix
Cst. Michael Rowe
Cst. Baljinder Singh
Cst. Benjamin Stevens
Cst. Greig Vandenberg
Cst. Michael Wheeler
Cst. Christine Wohlleben
Cst Thomas Zwissler

Congratulations to Cst. Ryan Jeffrey
(Delta), who was the recipient of the
British Columbia Association of
Chiefs of Police Shield of Merit for
best all around recruit performance
in basic training. Cst. Benjamin Stevens
(Vancouver) received the Abbotsford Police
Association
Oliver
Thomson
Trophy
for
outstanding physical fitness. Cst. William Dodds
(Saanich), Cst. Peter Froh (Vancouver), Cst.
Baljinder Singh (Vancouver) and Cst. Thomas
Zwissler (Vancouver) received the Vancouver Police
Union Excellence in Academics award for best
academic test results in all disciplines. Cst. William
Dodds (Saanich) received the British Columbia
Federation of Police Officers Valedictorian award
for being selected by his peers to represent his
class at the graduation ceremony. Cst. Martin
Steen (Saanich) was the recipient of the
Abbotsford Police Recruit Marksmanship award
for highest qualification score during Block 3

26

training (50/50). Vancouver Police Chief Constable
Jamie Graham was the keynote speaker at the
ceremony.

LEADERSHIP: LOOKING
BEYOND PERSONALITY
Sgt. Mike Novakowski
Faced with crisis, the man of character falls
back upon himself
Charles Degaulle.

At its core, the trait theory of leadership
focuses on individualized and enduring personal
characteristics (physical, mental, emotional, and
social attributes) that differentiate leaders from
non-leaders.
Leaders
that
exhibit
these
observable traits are “admired” (or idolized) by
others28. Trait theory is “content” focused (what
leader’s are) and little attention is paid to the
leaders actions (what leader’s do)29. In contrast,
an authentic and virtue based approach to
leadership focuses on the ideal of “goodness”;
conformity to moral and ethical principles. It is
not just doing the right thing (virtuous action),
but also being the right kind of person (virtuous
character)30. Examples of virtues that embody
leadership include honesty, courage31, and
humility32. Thus, is a virtue-based approach to
leadership theory a mere variation of a trait
theory, or does it involve considerations beyond
personality?
If one looks at the premise of the trait theory, it
is evident that a leader could possess the
personality traits of a promising leader, yet little
28

Hallman, Steve. Leadership Matters: Research About Leadership is Important.
[On-line] Available: http://www.uakron.edu/cba/lead/tools.html. [2001, October
25]
29
Allen, Gemmy. (1998). Leading. [On-line] Available:
http://ollie.dcccd.edu/mgmt1374book_ contents/4directing/leading/lead.htm
[2001, October 25]; Taylor, Pat.(1994). Leadership in Education. Emergency
Librarian, Vol. 21 Issue 3, p.9. Available: Academic Search FullTEXT EBSCOhost
[2001, October 25]
30
Harman, Gilbert. (1999). Virtue Ethics Without Character Traits. [On-line]
Available: http://www.cogsci.princeton.edu/~ghh/Thomson.html [2001, October26]
31
Lashway, Larry. (1996). Ethical Leadership. [On-line] Available:
http://eric.uoregon.edu/publications/digests/digets107.html [2001, October 26]
32
Wagner, Captain Daniel R. (1999) The Lost Virtue of Leadership. U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, Vol. 125 Issue 9, p.96 Available: Academic Search FullTEXT
EBSCOhost [2001, October 25]

Volume 3 Issue 4
May/June 2003

or no virtuous qualities. Stephen Covey found that
up until World War I, success was founded in
“character ethic”, representative of such virtues
as integrity, humility, fidelity, courage, and
justice. After World War I, a paradigm shift to a
“personality ethic” was observed where success
became a function of image, attitude, behaviour,
and skills “that lubricate the processes of human
interaction”33. Traits such as age, height, “good
looks”, confidence, desire to lead, or even the “Big
Five”
model
(surgency,
dependability,
agreeableness, adjustment, and intelligence)34
have little, if anything to do with virtue.
Virtue based leadership, in contrast, provides a
“moral compass” from which the common good and
personal
development
are
best
served.
Contemporary leaders who “engender virtue in
self, others and society through example and
virtuous conduct” will stimulate transformational
leadership35. Although a person who practices
virtue-based leadership may possess many of the
physical, personality, or ability attributes that
embody the trait theory, virtue-based leadership
involves considerations beyond personality traits
to include moral or ethical qualities which are not
captured by trait theory. It’s more about having
and demonstrating character, than being one!!!

In Leadership, character matters
Gerald Bass

Note-able Quote
The Ten Commandments contain 297 words. The
Bill of Rights is stated in 463 words. Lincoln’s
Gettysburg Address contains 266 words. A
recent federal directive to regulate the price of
cabbage contains 26,911 words.—The Atlanta
Journal

33

Covey, Stephen. (1990). The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People: Restoring
the Character Ethic. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster Inc.
34
Yukl, Gary. (2002). Leadership in Organizations. Upper Saddle River, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc.
35
Bass, Bernard M., & Steidlmeier, Paul (1999). Ethics, Character, and Authentic
Transformational Leadership Behaviour. Leadership Quarterly, Vol. 10 Issue 2,
p181. Available: Academic Search FullTEXT EBSCOhost [2001, October 25]

27

A LOUSY COP
Author unknown
Dear Mr./Mrs. Citizen
Well, I guess you have figured me
out. I seem to fit neatly into the
category you place me in. I'm
stereotyped,
characterized,
standardized, classified, grouped,
and always typical. I AM THE
LOUSY COP.
Unfortunately, the reverse isn't true. I can never
figure you out. From birth you teach your children
that I am a person to beware of. Then, you are
shocked when they identify me with my
traditional enemy....the criminal.
You accuse me of coddling juveniles, until I catch
your kid doing something wrong.
You take an hour lunch, and several coffee breaks
each day, then, point me out as a loafer if you see
me have just one cup.
You pride yourself on your polished manners, but
think nothing of interrupting my meals at noon
with your troubles.
You raise hell about the guy who cuts you off in
traffic, but, let me catch you doing the same
thing, and all of a sudden I am picking on you.
You know ALL the traffic laws, but never got one
single ticket you deserved.
You shout "Abuse of Authority" if you see me
driving fast to an emergency call, but raise nine
kinds of hell if I take more than 30 seconds
responding to yours.
You call it "Part of my job" if someone hits me,
but yell "Police brutality" if I strike back.
You would never think of telling your dentist how
to pull a badly decayed tooth, or your doctor how
to take out your appendix, but you are ALWAYS
willing to give me pointers on how to be a police
officer.

Volume 3 Issue 4
May/June 2003

You talk to me in a manner, and use language that
would assure a bloody nose from anyone else, but
you expect me to stand there and take your
verbal abuse without batting an eye.
You cry, "Something has to be done about crime",
but you can't be bothered to get involved.
You have no use for me what so ever, but of
course, it's OK for me to change a tire for your
wife, or deliver your baby in the back seat of my
patrol car enroute to the hospital, or save your
sons life with CPR and mouth to mouth
resuscitation, or even forsake time with MY
family working long hours overtime trying to find
your lost daughter.
So, dear citizen, you stand there on your soapbox
and rant and rave about the way I do my job,
calling me every name in the book, but, never stop
a minute to think that your property, your family,
and maybe your life might someday depend on one
thing......ME.
Respectfully,
A Lousy Cop

National Library of Canada Cataloguing in Publication Data

Main entry under title:
In service:10-8. -- Vol. 1, no. 1 (June 2001)Monthly.
Title from caption.
"A newsletter devoted to operational police officers across
British Columbia."
ISSN 1705-5717 = In service, 10-8
1. Police - British Columbia - Periodicals. 2. Police – Legal
status, laws, etc. – Canada – Cases – Periodicals. I. Justice
Institute of British Columbia. Police Academy. II. Title: In
service, 10-8. III. Title: In service, ten - eight.
HV7642.B74I57

363.2'09711'05

C2003-960041-6

For comments on or contributions to this
newsletter or to be added to our electronic
distribution list contact
Sgt. Mike Novakowski at the JIBC Police
Academy at (604) 528-5733 or e-mail
mnovakowski@jibc.bc.ca

28